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Striking the Peremptory Challenge from
Civil Litigation:
"Hey Batson, Stay Where You Belong!"t
I. Introduction
The peremptory challenge' has been recognized as essential
in providing for the oldest and most fundamental right in Amer-
t An earlier draft of this Comment was circulated among the members of the
United States Judicial Conferences Committee on Judicial Improvements, which is
currently examining the discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge in all forms of
litigation.
1. The examination process by which a trial court impanels a petit jury is called the
voir dire. See generally R. SIMON, THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 48-66 (1975). This pro-
cess - literally meaning "to speak the truth," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1575 (6th ed.
1990) - serves three major purposes: (1) to gather information upon which jury selec-
tion is based; (2) to provide a conduit of communication between attorneys on both sides
and the prospective jurors; and (3) to provide a forum in which the attorneys attempt to
exert some influence over how the jury will process the evidence and testimony to be
heard at trial. R. SIMON, supra, at 48. Optimally, the voir dire seeks to make prospective
jurors aware of their own prejudices and stereotypes. Id. The voir dire is also used to
educate prospective jurors with regard to the burdens of proof and elements of the
crimes or claims that are to be tried. Id.
Typically, twelve people, depending on the jurisdiction's jury size, are randomly se-
lected from a larger group of assembled prospective jurors, called the venire, and ques-
tioned by the judge as to their general fitness to serve. Id. at 50. The judge may choose
to excuse a juror(s) at this time. Id. Following this initial query, counsel from both sides
are permitted to question the randomly selected group. Id.
If either lawyer objects to the impaneling of a particular venire person(s), assuming
for simplicity that there is only one plaintiff and one defendant, that attorney may seek
to remove the venire person(s) by one of three types of challenges. The first of these,
beyond the scope of this Comment, is the challenge to the array. Id. This challenge may
be used by the lawyer when she believes that the entire prospective jury panel has been
irregularly selected. Id. The remaining two types of challenges are the subject of this
Comment. First, is the challenge for cause. Id. Under this procedure, the challenging
attorney dismisses a venire person for a particular cause. Id. The reason articulated usu-
ally concerns the venire person's life experiences, occupation, financial interests, or
preconceived biases. If the court accepts the basis for the challenge, the prospective juror
is excused. An unlimited number of challenges for cause may be used. Id.
Next, following the completion of the challenge for cause process, each lawyer may
choose to exercise a limited number of peremptory challenges. Id. The number of per-
mitted challenges of this type is restricted by law or court rule, and varies depending
upon the nature of the trial and whether the challenging party is the state or the defend-
ant in a criminal trial. Id. Because the challenging attorney need not state a reason for
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ican jurisprudence: the right to a fair trial by a jury of one's
peers.2 However, our justice system cannot lay claim to conceiv-
ing this device. Almost two hundred years before Columbus
sailed to the new world, the peremptory challenge had already
played a prominent role in the English trial by jury system.3
This system was described by Blackstone as "the glory of the
English law."'4 Thomas Jefferson considered trial by jury the
government's "anchor" to the Constitution.5 Why, then, has the
peremptory challenge been subjected to heavy judicial scrutiny
for over a century,6 culminating, at least for now, in the Su-
preme Court's decision of Batson v. Kentucky?7 The answer is
simple: the peremptory challenge often threatens the right to a
fair jury trial. In fact, it has become a significant means by
which lawyers can undermine that right. It has been used by
lawyers to strike all prospective jurors of a minority litigant's
race, often resulting in all-white juries.8 Although a litigant is
not guaranteed a jury composed of members of her race,' justice
is not promoted when the impaneled venire is racially dispro-
removing the prospective juror, the peremptory challenge is a powerful device. Id.
If any prospective juror is excused by either the challenge for cause or the peremp-
tory challenge, a new candidate is randomly chosen and the questioning begins again. Id.
The voir dire continues until a complete jury is impaneled to the satisfaction of both
attorneys. Id.
2. A fair and impartial jury trial is guaranteed under the sixth amendment for crim-
inal trials and the seventh amendment for civil trials. Specifically, "[i]n all criminal pros-
ecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury .. " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The seventh amendment provides that "[iln Suits at
common law.., the right of trial by jury shall be preserved ...." U.S. CONST. amend.
VII.
3. See L. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 56 (1973); T.
PLUNKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 433 (5th ed. 1956). The history of
the peremptory challenge is discussed infra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
4. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 689 (J. Gavit ed. 1941).
5. 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 266, 269 (J. Boyd ed. 1958).
6. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), examined infra notes 20-26
and accompanying text.
7. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). See infra notes 61-106 and accompanying text for a detailed
examination of the Batson decision.
8. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), discussed infra notes 61-106
and accompanying text; Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), discussed infra notes 32-
43 and accompanying text.
9. A litigant "is not constitutionally entitled to demand a proportionate number of
his race on the jury .... Swain, 380 U.S. at 208.
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portionate.10
This Comment will examine Batson, the Court's latest at-
tempt to restore the fundamental right to an impartial jury by
subjecting a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to the
limits of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. It will explore the importance of the peremptory challenge
in criminal litigation and its insignificance in the civil realm.
Part II of this Comment will chronicle the history of the pe-
remptory challenge and the early decisions that sought to con-
strain its abuse. This 'part will also review Batson and the case
law discussing the use of the peremptory challenge in civil litiga-
tion. Part III will analyze the extension of Batson to civil litiga-
tion, concluding not only that it is unconstitutional, but also
that it fails to achieve its intended purpose. Part III proposes
the elimination of the peremptory challenge in civil litigation.
This Comment concludes that the present challenge for cause
system suffices, with only minor modifications, to protect the
constitutional rights of both litigants and jurors in civil matters.
II. Background
A. History of the Peremptory Challenge
The use of the peremptory challenge has evolved through-
out its history. Until 1305, this device was available to both the
Crown and the defendant.1 However, the Crown's widespread
abuse of the challenge, resulting in juries that favored the prose-
cution, led Parliament to pass a statute limiting use of the pe-
remptory challenge to criminal defendants.12 Thus, only chal-
10. See, e.g., Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600 (1935). Patterson was one of the
infamous "Scottsboro Boys Cases," in which nine black youths were found guilty of rap-
ing two white women. Id. at 601-04. The United States Supreme Court vacated the judg-
ment of the Alabama Supreme Court, id. at 607, "upon the ground of the exclusion of
negroes . . . from jury service." Id. at 601.
The Scottsboro Boys.Cases continued for years, with several completely white juries
consistently convicting the youths of rape. See Weems v. State, 224 Ala. 524, 141 So. 215
(1932); Patterson v. State, 224 Ala. 531, 141 So. 195 (1932); Powell v. State, 224 Ala. 540,
141 So. 201 (1932). Historians now believe that all nine black youths were falsely accused
and convicted. See generally D. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN
SouTH 192-242 (1969).
11. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 347 (1st Eng. ed. 1769).
12. An Ordinance of Inquests, 33 Edw. 4 (1305).
3
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lenges for cause were available to the Crown."3 At English
common law, the peremptory challenge was also confined to
criminal cases."'
The peremptory challenge has evolved in American juris-
prudence from the adaptation of the English statute of 1305,
and from common law. 5 It was not until 1865, however, that
Congress permitted the federal government to use the peremp-
tory challenge in criminal trials.' Congress formally extended
the right to use the challenge in civil proceedings forty-six years
later.17 The peremptory challenge has now become firmly estab-
lished in the American court system.
13. Id. The statute states, in pertinent part:
He that challenges a juror or jurors for the King shall shew his cause ... but if
they that sue for the King will challenge any of those jurors, they shall assign of
their challenges a Cause Certain, and that the truth of the same challenge shall be
enquired of according to the custom of the court ....
Id.
English prosecutors are not permitted to exercise peremptory challenges to this day.
J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 148 (1977). However, there exists a judicially
created doctrine that arose from the 1305 statute, see supra note 12, known as "standing
jurors aside." J. VAN DYKE, supra, at 148. This doctrine permits the prosecution to dis-
miss jurors without "cause" by ordering an undesired juror to "stand aside" while an
attempt is made to assemble a jury panel of twelve. Id. If such a panel is gathered from
an enlarged venire, the "stand aside" jurors are dismissed. Id. Such a procedure effec-
tively circumvents the intent of the framers of the 1305 statute. Id. However, this pro-
cess has survived judicial attack in the English courts. Id. See, e.g., Ford Lord Grey of
Werk, 9 State Trials 128 (1682); James O'Coigly, 26 State Trials 1192 (1798). See gener-
ally Hughes, English Criminal Justice: Is It Better Than Ours?, 26 ARIz. L. REV. 507,
593-94 (1984); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-14 (1965), for a brief synopsis of the
history of the peremptory challenge in English jurisprudence.
14. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 217-18 n.21 (1965). In fact, the peremptory
challenge was intended only for defendants in capital cases but was later extended to
other criminal proceedings. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 353 (9th ed. 1783). Today,
the peremptory challenge is no longer used in English civil trials. J. VAN DYKE, supra
note 13, at 169 (1977).
15. See United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 480, 483-84 (1827) (recog-
nizing the peremptory challenge as originating in common law). For a detailed discussion
of the peremptory challenge in this country, see Swain, 380 U.S. at 214-21. The doctrine
of "standing jurors aside," discussed supra note 13, was rejected in this country in
United States v. Shackleford, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 588, 590 (1856). See generally Comment,
Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for Perpetuation of the All-White Jury,
52 VA. L. REV. 1157 (1966).
16. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 214-16. The criminal defendant had the right to exercise
peremptory challenges as early as 1790. Id. at 214.
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1982) and the historical references that follow it.
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B. Abuse of the Peremptory Challenge and Early Attempts at
Redress
Theoretically, the peremptory challenge, or strike as it is
often called, furnishes the means by which the constitutional re-
quirement of an impartial jury is accomplished. 18 Notwithstand-
ing this noble aim, the peremptory challenge has at times been
transformed into a weapon of prejudice. "Trial lawyers fre-
quently observe that they use their challenges not to secure im-
partial juries, but to secure juries likely to favor their
positions."
1. Antecedents to Swain v. Alabama
For over a century, American courts have endeavored to
solve the problem of the abusive use of peremptory challenges.
The following cases exemplify judicial attempts to eliminate ra-
cial discrimination from the jury selection process.
Strauder v. West Virginia20 was the first case in which the
Court considered the question of whether a state could exclude
18. Actually, the sixth amendment governing criminal actions, see supra note 2, ex-
pressly requires an "impartial jury," while the seventh amendment, controlling civil pro-
ceedings, does not. Nevertheless, it is well settled that impartiality is inherent in both
amendments. See generally J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CWVL PROCEDURE §
11.10, at 519-25, § 11.11, at 525 (1985).
19. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges
and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Cmi. L. REv. 153, 203 (1989).
Arguably, though, if each attorney uses peremptory strikes wisely, the result is an
impartial panel. Nevertheless, it must be noted that a comprehensive study of the use of
the peremptory challenge in twelve criminal trials concluded that lawyers generally exer-
cised their challenges poorly and irregularly. See Zeisel & Diamond, The Effect of Pe-
remptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in Federal District Court, 30
STAN. L. REv. 491 (1978). The study revealed that defense attorneys exercised their
strikes more effectively than prosecuting attorneys. Id. at 517-18.
Still, some jurists postulate that there is nothing wrong with a "dog-eat-dog" ap-
proach to the use of the peremptory challenge. See, e.g., King v. County of Nassau, 581
F. Supp. 493 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), discussed infra notes 131-41 and accompanying text. The
King court stated that "it is legitimate for parties to selfishly pursue their own interests
in making peremptory challenges ... just as the American free enterprise system advo-
cate[s] ... self-serving behavior ...." King, 581 F. Supp. at 500.
If the peremptory challenge is to perform the function of removing the "extreme"
jurors on both sides, perhaps the answer lies in improved clinical traiving to instruct
lawyers to recognize subtle traits of partiality.




blacks from serving on a jury." In Strauder, a black man was
convicted of murder in West Virginia.2 2 On appeal, the defend-
ant petitioned to remove the case to federal court because "no
colored man was eligible to be a member of the grand jury or to
serve on a petit jury in the State, [and therefore], he could not
have the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings in the
State of West Virginia ... enjoyed by white citizens."23
The Supreme Court, after reviewing the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment,2 ' held that exclusion of
blacks from jury service on the basis of race was repugnant to
the Constitution:
2 5
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly
denied by a statute all right to participate ... as jurors, because
of their color, though.., citizens, and... fully qualified, is... a
brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferi-
ority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impedi-
ment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice
which the law aims to secure to all others.26
The impact of Strauder was, however, very limited. While it
eliminated the most obvious discriminatory technique - a pro-
hibitive jury service statute - it offered no guidance concern-
ing the more subtle means by which lawyers seek to produce
partial juries.
Sixty years later, in Smith v. Texas, 7 the Court examined a
county jury selection system which resulted in underrepresenta-
21. The Court framed the issue as "whether, by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, every citizen of the United States has a right to a trial ... by a jury
selected and impanelled without discrimination against his race or color, because of race
or color . . . ." Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305.
22. Id. at 304.
23. Id. The West Virginia law at issue in Strauder stated: "All white male persons
who are twenty-one years of age and who are citizens of this State shall be eligible to
serve as jurors . . . ." Id. at 305.
24. Specifically, the equal protection clause provides that: "No state shall... deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
25. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310.
26. Id. at 308. The Court made an interesting analogy that illustrated the broad
expansion of the equal protection clause. "[I]f a law should be passed excluding all natu-
ralized Celtic Irishmen, would there be any doubt of its inconsistency with the spirit of
the (equal protection clause]." Id.
27. 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
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tion of blacks on grand juries over a seven-year period despite
the fact that blacks constituted twenty percent of the county's
population. 8 Reversing the defendant's conviction, the Court
described the jury's function as one of the "basic concepts of a
democratic society and a representative government. '2 9
The function of the jury was further developed in the
landmark civil case Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.,30 in which the
Court wrote:
The American tradition of trial by jury, considered in connection
with either criminal or civil proceedings necessarily contemplates
an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community.
This does not mean, of course, that every jury must contain rep-
resentatives of all the economic, social, religious, racial, political
and geographical groups of the community; frequently such repre-
sentation would be impossible. But it does mean that prospective
jurors shall be selected by court officials without systematic and
intentional exclusion of any of these groups.31
Thiel articulated the constitutional mandate that both
criminal and civil trials require fair and impartial juries in order
to protect the integrity and democratic ideals of the American
system of justice.
2. Swain v. Alabama: A Step Backward
In Swain v. Alabama, 2 an all-white jury convicted and sen-
tenced to death a black man for raping a white woman. 3 The
Court's examination of the evidence concerning jury selection in-
dicated that black males over twenty-one constituted twenty-six
percent of all males in the county in that age group, while only
ten to fifteen percent actually served on jury panels during the
twelve years preceding Swain.3 4 However, the Court did not find
28. Id. at 128-30. Only three blacks actually served on grand juries between the
years 1931 and 1938. Id. at 129.
29. Id. at 130. The jury's function was similarly espoused in Carter v. Jury Comm'n,
396 U.S. 320 (1970), discussed briefly infra note 323.
30. 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
31. Id. at 220 (emphasis added).
32. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
33. See Swain v. State, 275 Ala. 508, 156 So. 2d 368 (1963).
34. Swain, 380 U.S. at 205.
7
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such statistics indicative of merely "token" representation;"5 nor
did it consider this evidence as fashioning a "prima facie case of
invidious discrimination under the fourteenth amendment." S6
The Court rejected the cross-section requirement s espoused in
Thiel. s In doing so, the Court sanctioned the use of peremptory
challenges by lawyers on "grounds normally thought irrelevant
to legal proceedings. 3 9
35. Id. at 206.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 208:
[A] defendant in a criminal case is not constitutionally entitled to demand a pro-
portionate number of his race on the jury which tries him nor on the venire or jury
roll from which petit jurors are drawn. Neither the jury roll nor the venire need be
a perfect mirror of the community or accurately reflect the proportionate strength
of every identifiable group.
Id. (citations omitted).
Recently, however, in Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803 (1990), the Court ruled that
a cross-section was required on the venire, but not on the petit jury itself.
The Sixth Amendment requirement of a fair cross section on the venire is a means
of assuring, not a representative jury.., but an impartial one .... Without that
requirement, the State could draw up jury lists in such a manner as to produce a
pool of prospective jurors disproportionately ill disposed towards one or all classes
of defendants, and thus more likely to yield petit juries with similar disposition.
The State would have, in effect, unlimited peremptory challenges to compose the
pool in its favor. The fair-cross-section venire requirement assures, in other words,
that in the process of selecting the petit jury the prosecution and defense will
compete on an equal basis.
id. at 807 (emphasis in original).
Because American jurisprudence evolved from English custom, it is interesting to
note a difference between the American federal system and the historic English system
with regard to cross-section requirements in petit juries. In England centuries ago, King
John signed a charter permitting Jews to be tried by juries composed of an equal number
of Jews and Christians. This law was less of a favor to Jews than it was self-serving to
the King's interest in protecting property he regarded as his own. Further, laws were
created that permitted foreign merchants the right to juries composed of jurors half of
whom spoke the merchant's native language. The purpose of these laws, called de medie-
tate linguae, was to stimulate foreign business in England. See S. WISHMAN, ANATOMY OF
A JuRy 31 (1986).
Some states have instituted a cross-section requirement in petit jury selection rely-
ing on independent state constitutional grounds. See, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d
258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978), examined infra notes 44-60 and accompany-
ing text; Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S.
881 (1979), discussed infra note 117.
38. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
39. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220-21. The Court stated that the peremptory challenge sys-
tem "provides justification for striking any group of otherwise qualified jurors in any
given case, whether they be Negroes, Catholics, accountants or those with blue eyes." Id.
at 212. It also believed that the peremptory challenge could be exercised upon "sudden
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss2/5
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The Court created a presumption that state prosecutors use
peremptory challenges "to obtain a fair and impartial jury. '40 It
reasoned that "any other result... would establish a rule wholly
at odds with the peremptory challenge system as we know it.' 41
The Swain decision made it nearly impossible for a defend-
ant to establish a violation of his equal protection rights. In or-
der to overcome Swain, the litigant had to prove that "the pros-
ecutor in a county, in case after case, whatever the
circumstances ... [was] responsible for the removal of Negroes
who [had] been selected as qualified jurors. '4 Such a stringent
threshold was not easily reached. Few jurisdictions maintained
records of the patterns of peremptory strikes made by particular
prosecutors.' Thus, the Swain test resulted in an almost insur-
mountable hurdle.
3. People v. Wheeler: Back on Track
The Swain holding effectively gave prosecutors a free hand
to select partial juries, unrestricted by the equal protection
impressions and unaccountable prejudices... conceive[d] upon the bare looks and ges-
tures of another," id. at 220 (quoting Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892)),
"upon a juror's habits and associations," id. (quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70
(1887)), "or upon the feeling that the bare questioning [of a juror's] indifference may
sometimes provoke a resentment." Id. (quoting Lewis, 146 U.S. at 376).
40. Id. at 222.
41. Id. The Court described the function of the peremptory challenge as not only
eliminating "extremes of partiality on both sides, but [also] assuring the parties that the
jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed
before them, and not otherwise." Id. at 219. It reasoned that the peremptory challenge
allowed "counsel to ascertain the possibility of bias through probing questions on the
voir dire." Id.
42. Swain, 380 U.S. at 223. The Swain case itself is a classic example of just how
ridiculous this standard was. In Swain, the defendant demonstrated that during the pre-
vious fifteen years an average of six blacks were among the petit jury venire, but no
black had actually sat on a petit jury. Id. at 205. The Court, nevertheless, failed to con-
sider this to be proof of systematic exclusion of blacks. Id. at 226. The absurdity ex-
tended even further. If the defendant was to prove the systematic exclusion of blacks, he
had to demonstrate a pattern of exclusion by the particular prosecutor trying the case; a
showing of repeated discriminatory exclusion by all the prosecutors in the jurisdiction
was not sufficient to satisfy the Swain standard. Id. at 226-28.
43. See Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on
Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715, 1723 n.36 (1977); Smith, Swain v. Alabama: The Use of
Peremptory Challenges to Strike Blacks from Juries, 27 How. L.J. 1571 (1984) (discuss-
ing the impossibility of establishing a trend of peremptory strikes against blacks by a
newly hired prosecutor with no "track record"). Id. at 1576.
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clause. Though presented with a criminal matter, the Swain
Court did not analyze possible sixth amendment implications in
its attempt to prevent discrimination in criminal trials. The
sixth amendment, along with the cross-section requirement re-
jected by Swain, became the foundation for the California case,
People v. Wheeler.'5
In Wheeler, the black defendants, convicted of murder, ap-
pealed to the California Supreme Court, claiming the state de-
nied their right to trial by an impartial jury through the discrim-
inatory use of peremptory challenges." In addressing this claim,
the Wheeler court reviewed several United States Supreme
Court cases that found the cross-section rule essential in fulfill-
ing the constitutional requirement of an impartial jury.7 The
44. The Supreme Court did not apply the sixth amendment to criminal trial jury
selection until Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
45. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
46. Id. at 262, 583 P.2d at 752, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 893. This was a typical abusive
peremptory challenge case. The defendants were both black, and the man they were ac-
cused of murdering during a robbery was white. Id. Following the voir dire, the prosecu-
tor attempted to strike for cause all the black venire persons, but the court refused to
allow this. Id. The prosecutor then proceeded to strike every black using his peremptory
challenges. The resulting jury was completely white. Id.
47. Id. at 266-70, 583 P.2d 754-57, 148 Cal. Rptr. 896-99. The Wheeler court first
examined Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940). In Smith, which reversed a state convic-
tion on equal protection grounds based on an unfair jury, Justice Black stated: "[I]t is
part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that
the jury be a body truly representative of the community." Id. at 130. See supra notes
27-29 and accompanying text.
Next, the Wheeler court reviewed Glaser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942). In
Glaser, the defendants complained that women who were not members of the League of
Women Voters were being excluded from jury selection. Id. at 61. Though these conten-
tions were not proved, the Court stated that "[in choosing jurors], the concept of the jury
as a cross section of the community [must be considered]." Id. at 86.
Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 382 U.S. 217 (1946), the landmark decision that analyzed
the community cross-section requirement, was also examined. See supra notes 30-31 and
accompanying text. Following Thiel, the Wheeler court looked at Ballard v. United
States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946). In Ballard, the Court reversed a federal conviction because
women were excluded from the petit jury. Id. at 193-94. The Court reasoned that "the
exclusion of one [sex] may... make the jury less representative of the community than
would be if an economic or racial group were excluded." Id.
The Wheeler court next reviewed Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972). In Peters,
blacks were arbitrarily removed from the jury. Id. at 503-04. Justice Marshall concluded,
in a plurality opinion, that the exclusion from jury service of a large and identifiable
segment of society "deprives the jury of a perspective on human events that may have
unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented." Id.
Finally, the Wheeler court examined the case of Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss2/5
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Swain Court, of course, had rejected the cross-section rule for
petit juries. s Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court
adopted this rule in Wheeler, concluding that the defendants
were entitled to an impartial jury consisting of a representative
cross-section, and "that the use of peremptory challenges to re-
move prospective jurors on the sole ground of group bias vio-
lates the right to trial by jury . . .,,9
Wheeler attempted to draw a bright line distinction be-
tween group bias and specific bias.50 The court defined group
(1975). Taylor also dealt with the exclusion of women from petit juries. Id. at 528-30. In
eloquent language, the Court stressed the fundamental objective of the American jury.
The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power - to
make available the commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against
the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the professional or
perhaps over conditioned or biased response of a judge. This prophylactic vehicle
is not provided if the jury pool is made up of only special segments of the popu-
lace or if large, distinctive groups are excluded from the pool. Community partici-
pation ... is not only consistent with our democratic heritage but is also critical to
public confidence.... Restricting jury service to only special groups or excluding
identifiable segments playing major roles in the community cannot be squared
with the constitutional concept of jury trial.
Id. at 530 (citation omitted).
48. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
49. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 276-77, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903 (empha-
sis added). It would appear that the California Supreme Court was in direct conflict with
the United States Supreme Court decision in Swain when it instituted a cross-section
rule in state petit jury selection. However, a closer look indicates no clash or impropriety
with the Swain Court. Justice Mosk, the author of the majority opinion, later wrote that
"[iun California, we have employed independent nonfederal grounds found in our State
Constitution (Article I, Section 16) to prevent the use of peremptory challenges for ra-
cially discriminatory purposes." Letter of Justice Stanley Mosk, N.Y. Times, June 24,
1983, at A24, col. 3. It is well settled that state constitutional guarantees may exceed
those granted by the Federal Constitution. See infra note 89 for a further discussion of
this concept and its particular effect on the Wheeler decision.
50. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 275-76, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902-03. In
the case of specific bias - "a bias relating to the particular case or trial or the parties or
witnesses thereto," id. - peremptory strikes were allowed because their use would not
"significantly skew the population mix of the venire in one direction or another; rather,
they promote impartiality of the jury without destroying its representativeness." Id. Ex-
amples of specific bias include jurors having relatives in law enforcement, prior criminal
records, or past negative experiences with the police. Id.
The effort to differentiate between group bias and specific bias has weakened the
decision. For example, the state may justifiably challenge a juror for his "looks" based
upon apparent lack of attentiveness to the judicial proceeding. See Note, Due Process
Limits on Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenges, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1013, 1022-23 (1989).
However, it is difficult to know if the challenge was sincere or if it stemmed from racial,
ethnic or religious motives. Id. Under Wheeler, the answer would be unclear. See gener-
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bias as prejudice against certain jurors "merely because they are
members of an identifiable group distinguished on racial, reli-
gious, ethnic or similar grounds.""1 Peremptory challenges were
not permitted against the "group" because they would upset
"the demographic balance of the venire [and frustrate] the pri-
mary purpose of the representative cross-section requirement." 2
Wheeler then assessed the means by which the complaining
party could expose group bias. The court first established a pre-
sumption that the "party exercising a peremptory challenge is
doing so on a constitutionally permissible ground."6 3 The court
then relied on more "traditional procedures"" to unmask the
discrimination. This was accomplished by the complaining
party's assertion of group bias to the court's satisfaction.55 After
a complete record indicating all relevant circumstances was
presented, the complaining party had to "establish that the per-
sons excluded [were] members of a cognizable group within the
meaning of the representative cross-section rule. '5 6
Once the complaining party demonstrated a prima facie
ally Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 322-44 (1987).
Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in which racism has
played and still plays a dominant role. Because of this shared experience, we also
inevitably share many ideas, attitudes, and beliefs that attach significance to an
individual's race and induce negative feelings and opinions about nonwhites. To
the extent that this cultural belief has influenced all of us, we are all racists. At
the same time most of us are unaware of our racism. We do not recognize the ways
in which our cultural experience has influenced our beliefs about race or the occa-
sions on which those beliefs affect our actions. In other words, a large part of the
behavior that produces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial
motivation.
Id. at 322 (footnotes omitted).
51. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 276-77, 583 P.2d at 760-61, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902-03.
52. Id. at 279, 583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 904-05.
53. Id. at 279-80, 583 P.2d at 762-63, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 904-05. In establishing this
presumption, the court relied on the "legislative intent underlying such challenges ...
and [its] respect for counsel as officers of the court." Id.
54. Id. at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
55. Id.
56. Id. The court declined to address the concept of the cognizable group because
the challenged parties were black, therefore clearly falling within this classification. Id.
at n.26. Although doubt remains as to what a cognizable group is, a working judicial
definition would characterize a segment of the population, historically discriminated
against in American society, specifically minority races, as a "cognizable group." See in-
fra note 229. A statistical definition has also been offered. See infra note 79.
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case, the burden shifted to the challenging party to explain his
challenges, asserting a cause related to the trial at hand.57 The
judge, in her discretion, could accept the explanation, in which
case the trial would continue, or she could dismiss the entire
jury and begin again."
Wheeler, even with its flawed distinction between group and
specific bias, nevertheless set the impartial jury ship back on
course.' It did not violate the Swain decision, yet it provided an
effective and workable method through which defendants could
attack the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by the
prosecutor; this was something Swain never proffered.60
C. Batson v. Kentucky: A Contemporary Triumph
Barnacles continued to attach to the Swain decision. In
1983, Justices Marshall and Brennan indicated that the time
had come for the Court to consider overruling Swain.e" Three
57. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 278-82, 583 P.2d at 762-65, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 904-06.
58. Id. at 282, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
59. The Wheeler rationale was ultimately incorporated in Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986), discussed infra notes 61-106 and accompanying text.
60. Five years after the Wheeler decision, Justice Mosk said that "complaints about
racial composition of trial juries have been virtually eliminated in California [because of
Wheeler]." Letter of Justice Stanley Mosk, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1983, at A24, col. 3.
61. See McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963-70 (1983) (Marshall, J., joined by
Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Justice Marshall stated: "In the nearly
two decades since it was decided, Swain has been the subject of almost universal and
often scathing criticism. Since every defendant is entitled to equal protection of the laws
... I would... reexamine the standard set forth in Swain." Id. at 964-66 (emphasis in
original) (footnotes omitted).
In McCray, a black man was accused of robbing a white person. Id. at 963. The
prosecutor exercised his peremptory challenges to exclude all black and Hispanic venire
members. Id. Following conviction by the all-white jury, the defendant moved for a mis-
trial, asserting that the prosecutor violated the Constitution through his challenges, or in
the alternative, that a hearing be conducted to examine the prosecutor's motives in using
his challenges. Id. These motions were denied and the trial court's rulings were affirmed
by New York's highest court. Id. The defendant unsuccessfully sought certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court. Id. at 961.
The defendant moved for reargument in the New York Court of Appeals, in light of
the strongly worded Marshall dissent that accompanied the denial of certiorari; but the
motion was denied. People v. McCray, 60 N.Y.2d 587, 454 N.E.2d 127, 467 N.Y.S.2d 1031
(1983).
Having exhausted all of his state remedies, the defendant filed for, and was granted,
a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court. McCray v. Abrams, 576 F. Supp.
1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). The petition was later affirmed in part, vacated in part, and re-
manded. McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984). See infra note 137 for a fur-
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years later Swain was partially overruled in Batson v.
Kentucky.2
1. Facts and Procedural History
Batson, a black man, was indicted in Kentucky on burglary
charges." During the voir dire,64 the prosecutor used his pe-
remptory challenges to remove all four black venire persons,
leaving an all-white jury.65 After considering the defendant's mo-
tion to discharge the jury because the prosecutor's removals vio-
lated Batson's rights under the sixth and fourteenth amend-
ments, the trial judge ruled that peremptory challenges could be
used to strike any potential jurors.6 6 Batson was convicted on all
counts. 7
On appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court, Batson asserted
that his rights under both the state and federal constitutions
had been violated because he had been denied a trial by an im-
partial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community. He
also contended that the prosecutor had engaged in a "pattern"
of discriminatory strikes. Thus, the requirements for establish-
ing a prima facie equal protection violation under Swain had
been met. 9
Affirming the lower court's decision, the Kentucky Supreme
Court rejected the reasoning of Wheeler 0 and a similar Massa-
chusetts decisionI reaffirming its reliance on Swain." The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari."
ther discussion of McCray.
62. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
63. Id. at 82.
64. See supra note 1 for a discussion of the voir dire process.




69. Id. at 84.
70. See supra notes 44-60 and accompanying text.
71. See Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444
U.S. 881 (1979). This case, like Wheeler, advocated a cross-section requirement. Id. at
478-83, 387 N.E.2d at 510-13. See infra note 117 for a discussion of the Soares case.
72. Batson, 476 U.S. at 84.
73. Batson v. Kentucky, 471 U.S. 1052 (1985).
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2. The Defendant's Prima Facie Case of Purposeful Jury
Discrimination: A New Standard
Batson "require[d] [the Court] to reexamine that portion of
Swain... concerning the evidentiary burden placed on a crimi-
nal defendant who claims that he has been denied equal protec-
tion through the State's use of peremptory challenges to exclude
members of his race from the petit jury. 7 This inquiry resulted
in the partial overruling of Swain 5 and the reaffirmation of
Strauder v. West Virginia.6 In its decision, the Court an-
nounced a new purposeful discrimination standard, consisting of
two steps: first, the defendant had to "establish a prima facie
case of purposeful discrimination";" then, if the prima facie case
was demonstrated, the burden shifted to the prosecutor to
"come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black
jurors... [but one not rising] to the level justifying exercise of a
challenge for cause. '7 8
To satisfy the first step, the defendant "must show that he
is a member of a cognizable racial group71 ... and that the pros-
ecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the
venire members of the defendant's race."80 The Court stated
that the defendant could "rely on the fact, as to which there can
be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury se-
74. Batson, 476 U.S. at 82 (footnote omitted).
75. Id. at 93. The Swain evidentiary burden, discussed supra notes 42-43 and ac-
companying text, was considered too difficult to sustain. Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-96.
76. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of Strauder. The Batson Court noted that "[tihe principles announced in
Strauder have never been questioned in any subsequent decision of [the] Court." Bat-
son, 476 U.S. at 89.
77. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
78. Id. at 97.
79. The concept of a "cognizable racial group" was auldressed in Castaneda v. Par-
tida, 430 U.S. 482, 494-95 (1977). Although Castaneda dealt with discriminatory prac-
tices in grand jury selection, the Court's analysis is also appropriate for petit jury selec-
tion. Castaneda applied a statistically oriented test. Id. at 496-97 n.17. To prove
membership in such a group, one must show a "significant disparity between the number
of minorities selected by an actor and the number that a random process would have
been expected to produce." Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire,
Peremptory Challenges and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CH. L. REv. 153, 170
(1989). See also Pottinger v. Warden, 716 F. Supp. 1005, 1008 (W.D. Ky. 1989) ("[Tihe
striking of one black [prospective] juror [does not] comprise a prima facie case if the
racial reason is not apparent, from statistical inference or other reasons.").
80. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).
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lection practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a
mind to discriminate.' 81 "Finally, the defendant must show
that these facts and any other relevant circumstances 2 raise an
inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the
veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race." 83
3. The Prosecutor's Neutral Explanation
As explained above, once the defendant has established a
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, the burden shifts
to the prosecutor to provide a neutral explanation for challeng-
ing the black prospective jurors.8 4 This explanation, according to
the Court, falls somewhat short of a challenge for cause. e6 The
prosecutor must articulate reasons related to the case. He can-
not simply "rebut the ... [defendant's] prima facie case of dis-
crimination by stating merely that he challenged [prospective]
jurors of the defendant's race on the assumption - or his intui-
tive judgment - that they would be partial to the defendant
because of their shared race."8' 6
81. Id. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)). The situation in
Avery was quite interesting. Names of the venire were written on color-coded paper. A
different color was used for each race. The trial judge then selected the jury panel by
drawing the pieces of paper at "random." Avery, 345 U.S. at 560-62. The Supreme Court
found a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, even though no evidence had been
presented to prove deliberate discrimination in the selection process, because the use of
color-coding provided the opportunity for discrimination. Id.
82. The Court permitted great latitude in the determination of "relevant circum-
stances." Historical patterns of striking prospective jurors of the defendant's race in a
particular venire, as well as specific questions and statements made by the prosecutor
during the voir dire examination, may suffice. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97. Further, the
Court stated that the trial judge had discretion in supervising the voir dire to decide
whether the use of peremptory challenges constituted a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion. Id. at 97.
83. Id. at 96.
84. Id. at 97.
85. Id. For a discussion of the challenge for cause, see supra note 1.
86. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. Nor can the prosecutor simply employ "racial arithme-
tic"; see, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D. Mo. 1989) (prosecutor
did not meet his burden by simply stating that only two of five black prospective jurors
were struck).
While the Court did not provide a procedure for applying this new two-step stan-
dard, one has been devised. In United States v. Alcantar, 832 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir. 1987),
the Ninth Circuit stated that the district court must allow the complaining party to hear
and respond to explanations rebutting an alleged prima facie case of discrimination. Id.
at 1180. The challenges will not stand if the district court refuses the complaining party
[Vol. 11:357
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4. The Majority's Reasoning
In overruling the portion of Swain that announced the evi-
dentiary burdens necessary to develop a prima facie case of dis-
crimination,87 the Court based its decision on the equal protec-
tion clause,"s and expressly avoided any discussion of sixth
amendment claims.'9
The Court began its equal protection analysis with an exam-
ination of Strauder v. West Virginia,90 noting that Strauder had
"laid the foundation" for the eradication of racial discrimination
an opportunity to hear the reasons for excluding potential jurors and to argue that those
reasons are pretextual. Id. See also United States v. Alvarado, 891 F.2d 439, 440-43 (2d
Cir. 1989).
87. Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-96. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Swain evidentiary burden.
88. See supra note 24 for the text of the equal protection clause. One of the most
important elements of a violation of the equal protection clause is "state action." See
infra notes 253-89 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the state action
concept.
89. "We... express no view on the merits of any... Sixth Amendment arguments."
Batson, 476 U.S. at 85 n.4. This apparently places the validity of Wheeler in doubt.
Wheeler, along with Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1985) and McCray v. Abrams,
750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984), was announced on sixth amendment/cross-section require-
ment grounds. In light of the Batson decision, both Booker and McCray were vacated
and remanded by the Supreme Court. Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1985), va-
cated, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986); McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (1984), reh'g denied, 756
F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1985) (en banc), vacated, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986).
A closer look, however, may indicate that Wheeler's rationale is still legitimate.
Booker and McCray both dealt with a black criminal defendant's objection to the use of
peremptory challenges by the prosecutor. See Booker, 775 F.2d at 763-64; McCray, 750
F.2d at 1114-16. These "Batson-like" facts appear to be properly suited to a fourteenth
amendment equal protection analysis. See supra notes 63-73 and accompanying text.
Although Wheeler was factually similar to Booker and McCray, see supra note 46
and accompanying text, its holding was based upon state constitutional and sixth
amendment grounds. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr.
890 (1978) ("[We] hold that in this state the right to trial by a jury drawn from a repre-
sentative cross section of the community is guaranteed equally and independently by the
Sixth Amendment... and the California Constitution."). Id. at 268, 583 P.2d at 758, 148
Cal. Rptr. at 900 (footnote omitted).
Historically, state court decisions are not overruled by the federal courts if the state
constitutional protections exceed those granted by the Federal Constitution. See, e.g.,
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) ("[T]he State [can] exercise
its... sovereign right to adopt in its constitution individual [rights] more expansive than
those conferred by the Federal Constitution."). Id. at 81. See also Cooper v. California,
386 U.S. 58 (1967) ("[T]he State... [has the] power to impose higher standards... than
required by the Federal Constitution if it chooses to do so."). Id. at 62.
90. 100 U.S. 303 (1879). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 20-26 and
accompanying text.
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in jury selection.' The Court found that the exclusion of black
jurors discriminates against both the defendant and the ex-
cluded potential jurors." Furthermore, the harm suffered as a
result of discriminatory use of peremptory strikes "extends be-
yond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to
touch the entire community."" The Court, therefore, held that:
Although a prosecutor ordinarily is permitted to exercise peremp-
tory challenges ... [without explanation,] the Equal Protection
Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely
on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as
a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case
against a black defendant."
Nevertheless, the majority rejected Justice Marshall's pro-
posed solution, which called for the elimination of the peremp-
tory challenge." "While the Constitution does not confer a right
to peremptory challenges.., those challenges traditionally have
been viewed as one means of assuring the selection of a qualified
and unbiased jury."'"
91. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85.
92. Id. at 87. See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) (person's race is "unrelated to his fitness as a juror"). The Batson Court
said "that by denying a person participation in jury service on account of his race, the
state unconstitutionally discriminated against the excluded juror." Batson, 476 U.S. at
87. A further discussion of the discrimination suffered by potential jurors because of
exclusion is found infra note 323.
93. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 (public confidence in our system of justice would be
undermined).
94. Id. at 89 (citations omitted).
95. See id. at 102-03. See infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Justice Marshall's concurring opinion.
96. Batson, 476 U.S. at 91 (citations omitted). The Court's holding was limited to
the prosecutor's actions in a criminal trial. Id. at 90. One issue arising in the wake of
Batson was whether it applied to the discriminatory use of peremptory strikes by the
defense. Although Batson was silent on this issue, a recent case held that Batson did
apply to the use of peremptory strikes by the defense. See People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d
638, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1990) (the "Howard Beach Case" in which the
court, relying on Batson and on state constitutional grounds, restricted the use of pe-
remptory challenges by the white defendants).
Commentators have debated this issue. See Note, Discrimination By the Defense:
Peremptory Challenges after Batson v. Kentucky, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 355 (1988) (arguing
that continued use of discriminatory challenges by the defense violates the equal protec-
tion clause). But see Goldwasser, Limiting A Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory
Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 HARv. L. REv. 808
(1989) (stating that criminal defendants should have the widest possible latitude in con-
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss2/5
19911 STRIKING THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE 375
5. The Marshall Concurrence
The Batson case provoked strong opinions from all of the
Justices,9 7 but Justice Marshall's concurrence" is the most wor-
thy of close examination. Justice Marshall called Justice Pow-
ell's majority opinion "eloquent" ' and a "historic step toward
eliminating the shameful practice of racial discrimination in the
selection of juries."100 He concluded, however, that racial dis-
crimination can end only by "eliminating peremptory challenges
entirely.''10o
Justice Marshall believed that the "reformed" peremptory
ducting their defense).
Another issue - whether Batson extends to civil litigation - is the subject of this
Comment. See, e.g., Note, Batson v. Kentucky: Challenging the Use of the Peremptory
Challenge, 15 AM. J. CRIm. L. 263 (1988); Comment, Vitiation of Peremptory Challenge
in Civil Actions: Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. Rxv. 155 (1986) (both
advocating free use of the peremptory challenge in civil litigation). But see Note, The
Civil Implications of Batson v. Kentucky and State v. Gilmore: A Further Look at Limi-
tations on the Peremptory Challenge, 40 RutrGxss L. REv. 891 (1988) (stating that Bat-
son is fully applicable to civil actions).
At least one commentator has reasoned that the application of the equal protection
clause to the Batson case should be dismissed in favor of a due process approach. See
Note, Due Process Limits on Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenges, 102 HAav. L. REv.
1013 (1989). The author argued that the sixth amendment and the equal protection
clause fail to prevent discrimination in jury selection. Id. at 1015-23. Because a discern-
ible liberty interest of the defendant is at stake, the removal of a qualified juror by a
peremptory strike does not comply with the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Id. at 1024-34. This analysis might also apply to civil proceedings because the civil
litigant has a discernible property interest guaranteed by the due process clause.
97. These opinions include: concurrences by Justice White, Batson, 476 U.S. at 100;
Justice O'Connor, id. at 111 (stating that Batson should not be applied retroactively);
Justice Marshall, id. at 102, discussed infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text; Justice
Stevens, joined by Justice Brennan, id. at 108 (agreeing that the equal protection clause
should be applied to the discrimination issue even though the defense counsel failed to
rely on that ground on certiorari); dissents by Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice
Rehnquist, id. at 112 (stating that Swain should not be overruled based upon an equal
protection argument that was not raised by the defendant on certiorari, that the peremp-
tory challenge should not be restricted in any manner, and that the Court's decision
should not be applied retroactively); Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger,
id. at 134 (expressing the view that the Swain "historical pattern of discriminatory
strikes" standard should still be adhered to, and not the majority's reasoning that a pro-
secutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from one particular jury consti-
tutes an equal protection violation).
98. Batson, 476 U.S. at 102.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 102-03.
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challenge still provided the means by which the prosecutor could
discriminate in jury selection.'0 2 For example, he noted, "de-
fendants cannot attack the discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges at all unless the challenges are so flagrant as to estab-
lish a prima facie case."'' 0 Furthermore, he stated, it is also diffi-
cult for a trial court to assess a "prosecutor's motives."'' Justice
Marshall preferred the complete elimination of the peremptory
challenge from the criminal justice system. 05 Under Justice
Marshall's rationale, neither the prosecution nor the defense
would be permitted to exercise the challenges.0 6
D. The Peremptory Challenge in Civil Litigation
1. Pre-Batson
Even before Batson, a number of courts, both state and fed-
eral, had examined the issue of the discriminatory use of pe-
remptory challenges in civil matters.
For example, in Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co., 0 7 which involved
a false imprisonment and slander action by a black plaintiff, the
Supreme Court of Alaska held that although no blacks were on
the jury, no prima facie case of discrimination had been
shown.'08 "[T]he constitutional fair- and impartial - jury
102. Id. at 105-07.
103. Id. at 105. Justice Marshall's fears may be well founded. For example, in
Woods v. Dugger, 711 F. Supp. 586 (M.D. Fla. 1989), the court implied that even "token"
black representation on the jury defeats any inference of discrimination.
A prosecutor's leaving black jurors unchallenged on the final jury, a prosecutor's
having only a small number of black jurors on the venire from which the jurors are
selected, and evidence of non-racial reasons for the prosecutor's challenges, tend
to rebut an inference arising solely from an alleged pattern of discriminatory pe-
remptory challenges.
Id. at 595 (footnote omitted).
104. Batson, 476 U.S. at 105.
105. Id. at 106.
106. Id. at 107. Justice Marshall wrote that the criminal justice system "requires not
only freedom from any bias against the accused, but also from any prejudice against his
prosecution. Between him and the state the scales are to be evenly held." Id. at 107
(quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)). But see Brown, McGuire & Winters,
The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative Device in Criminal Trials: Traditional
Use or Abuse, 14 NEw ENG. L. REv. 192 (1978) (arguing that while the prosecutor should
be banned from utilizing the peremptory challenge, the defendant's use of the challenge
should be permitted because of its necessity in providing for a fair trial).
107. 512 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1973).
108. Id. at 582.
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guaranty does not require that every economic, racial or ethnic
class shall be represented on every jury venire or panel.' ' 109
Under the strict Swain rationale, 110 the plaintiff "failed to sus-
tain her burden of proving that the method by which the jury
was selected was one [designed] to exclude . . .systematically
and intentionally some cognizable group or class of citizens in
the community." '
In 1983, an intermediate California appellate court ex-
amined whether "the exercise of peremptory challenges in civil
proceedings is subject to scrutiny under the Constitutional stan-
dard announced in... Wheeler."'' In Holley v. J & S Sweeping
Co., a black plaintiff brought a negligence action against the de-
fendant. " ' The case was tried before an all-white jury, and was
decided in favor of the defendants. " The appellate court re-
versed, holding that "the systematic exclusion of [prospective]
jurors ... in either criminal or civil proceedings.., is constitu-
tionally impermissible [and subject to the Wheeler safe-
guards]." 1 5 The court found that in both criminal and civil tri-
als, the jury "perform[s] the same important function of
ultimate fact finders under the same state constitutional
guarantee." 1 6
Shortly after the Holley decision, a Massachusetts interme-
diate appellate court expressed, in dicta, its desire to apply the
state's "Wheeler equivalent" 11 to civil actions.118 In Terrio v.
109. Id. (quoting Nolan v. United States, 423 F.2d 1031, 1035 (10th Cir. 1969)).
110. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). See supra notes 32-43 and accompany-
ing text.
111. Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575, 582 (Alaska 1973) (citations omitted).
112. Holley v. J & S Sweeping Co., 143 Cal. App. 3d 588, 192 Cal. Rptr. 74 (1983)
(citations omitted). See supra notes 44-60 and accompanying text for a detailed discus-
sion of Wheeler.
113. Holley, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 590, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 593, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 77 (emphasis added).
116. Id. at 592, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
117. Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S.
881 (1979). The facts in Soares were similar to the facts in Wheeler. The prosecutor had
utilized his peremptory challenges to strike twelve of thirteen black venire persons. Id. at
473, 387 N.E.2d at 508. In resolving the issue of discriminatory strikes, the Soares court
adopted a test similar to that announced in Wheeler, Id. at 488-91, 387 N.E.2d at 516-18.
It concluded that the right to trial by jury required that the jury be representative of the
community as a whole. Id. at 478-83, 387 N.E.2d at 510-13.
118. In Terrio v. McDonough, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 163, 450 N.E.2d 190 (1983), a
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McDonough,'" the court balanced the importance of safeguards
in civil and criminal litigation.'2 0 It concluded that while the
consequences of criminal actions might demand greater protec-
tion, certain civil cases in which peremptory challenges were
used in a discriminatory manner could also have serious
consequences.'
The last notable pre-Batson state court decision was City of
Miami v. Cornett.' In Cornett, a black plaintiff lost his per-
sonal injury case against the city and two of its police officers. 23
The action was tried before an all-white jury after four blacks
had been removed by peremptory challenges. 24 Following the
verdict, the trial judge granted the plaintiff a new trial. 2 5
On appeal, the appellate division examined the case in light
of the Florida Supreme Court's decision in State v. Neil, 26 a
prima facie case was not developed according to the Soares criteria; therefore this issue
could not be addressed directly. Id. at 172, 450 N.E.2d at 196.
119. Id. at 163, 450 N.E.2d 190.
120. Id. at 167-70, 450 N.E.2d at 194-96.
121. Id. at 170, 450 N.E.2d at 195. For example, the court made a reference to
Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1973), discussed supra notes 107-11 and
accompanying text.
122. 463 So. 2d 399 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
123. Id. at 400.
124. Id.
125. Id. In his order granting a new trial to the plaintiff, the trial judge reviewed the
social and racial unrest that plagued Miami at the time of Cornett. The judge noted two
happenings that preceded Cornett by just a few weeks: first, the decision in Andrews v.
State, 438 So. 2d 480 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), vacated, 459 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1985); and
second, the infamous "McDuffie Riots." Andrews, 438 So. 2d at 482 n.4. In McDuffie, a
black businessman was brutally beaten to death by several white police officers. Miami
Times, June 23, 1983, at 1, col. 1. The officers were acquitted. Id. As in Cornett, all the
black prospective jurors were removed from the venire by the opposing counsel's pe-
remptory challenges. Id. See Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease but Killing
the Patient, 1987 SuP. CT. REV. 97, 153; Cornett, 463 So. 2d at 400-01. The plaintiff in
Cornett was paralyzed from the waist down after the incident with the police, and the
trial judge greatly feared that racial tensions could explode. Id. at 400.
126. 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984). Neil, the Florida equivalent of California's Wheeler,
see supra notes 44-60 and accompanying text, concerned the trial of a black man accused
of murdering a Haitian immigrant. Neil, 457 So. 2d at 482. The prosecutor used his
peremptory challenges to remove the first three blacks called from the venire. Id. Neil
argued that the prosecution's challenges were discriminatory. Id. The court ruled in
favor of the prosecution, stating that it need not explain its challenges. Id. at 482-83.
Neil was convicted. Id. at 483.
On appeal, Neil claimed the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution's chal-
lenges to stand. Id. The appellate court, recognizing the implications of this issue, certi-
fied the question of whether the prosecution must explain its peremptory challenges, id.
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criminal case, in which the court held that further adherence to
Swain v. Alabama117 "would impede rather than further the
right to a fair and impartial trial .... ",128 The Cornett court first
considered whether Neil applied to civil actions.12' Finding that
it did, the court stated that while the Florida Constitution "does
not expressly grant civil litigants the right of trial by an impar-
tial jury, we believe that anything less . . . is the functional
equivalent of no jury at all."'3
In the notable pre-Batson decision of King v. County of
Nassau,"' one federal court also addressed the use of peremp-
tory challenges in civil trials. King involved an equal employ-
ment opportunity suit brought by a black plaintiff against a
public county college, which had used its peremptory challenges
to remove two black prospective jurors. 3 2 Following both
strikes, the plaintiff moved to require the county to demonstrate
that no discriminatory motive influenced the exercise of the
challenges. "'
A hearing was held in the magistrate's chambers to discuss
the plaintiff's motions.' 3 The county argued that during the voir
dire, the two black venire persons sat isolated from the rest
physically as well as "emotionally ... [and therefore would not
be able to] objectively deliberate with other jurors in the case
should they be selected as such."" s5 The magistrate ruled in
at 482, and submitted it to the Florida Supreme Court. Id. at 483.
Florida's highest court ruled that the prosecution must show that the peremptory
challenges in question were not racially motivated when the challenged party demon-
strates to the court that such an explanation is warranted. Id. at 488. The case was
remanded for a new trial. Id.
127. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). See supra notes 32-43 and accompanying text.
128. Cornett, 463 So. 2d at 401.
129. Id. at 402.
130. Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
131. 581 F. Supp. 493 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
132. Id. at 494-95.
133. Id. at 495. It is worth noting that the black plaintiff exercised his peremptory
strikes to remove two white venire persons following all challenges for cause. Of the four-
teen prospective jurors remaining, only two were black. Id.
One issue that arises in such a situation is whether the black plaintiff, in exercising
his peremptory challenges in striking white venire persons, need explain his challenges
on neutral criteria. See infra note 229 for a discussion of the Court-imposed multi-tiered
equal protection analysis and its possible effect on this scenario.
134. King, 581 F. Supp. at 495.
135. Id. The county also argued that the black venire persons were "less than com-
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favor of the county."'
In reviewing this ruling, the district court discussed both
McCray v. Abrams17 and Swain'58 to determine whether to ap-
ply McCray, a criminal holding, to the civil case at bar.139 The
court determined that it should not."4 "Swain is the correct
statement of the law and is applicable to both criminal and civil
cases, regardless of whether the peremptory challenge is made
by a governmental entity or a private party."14'
2. Post-Batson
Batson14 2 was based upon the fourteenth amendment equal
protection clause. " " To prove a violation of this clause, an ag-
grieved party must demonstrate the presence of state action.
This requirement presents difficulty in civil litigation between
private parties. 44
The decisions immediately following Batson did not directly
address the state action issue. In the civil case of Esposito v.
Buonome, 5 the court held that Batson was not applicable.'"
municative" and on that basis could be challenged. Id.
136. The magistrate stated that the "[d]efendant's. . . opinion [that] these two ju-
rors [challenged by the county] would not be so open to the reception of evidence...
[was] a sufficient reason." Id. at 496.
137. 576 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), ali'd, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984). In his
petition for habeas corpus, McCray, a black defendant convicted at trial, alleged that the
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges violated the Constitution because all black
and Hispanic venire persons were removed from the jury. McCray, 750 F.2d at 1114. See
supra note 61 for a discussion of McCray on certiorari to the Supreme Court.
The Second Circuit, affirming in part the petition for habeas corpus, held that the
prosecutor had to offer non-racial explanations to remove the black jurors struck by pe-
remptory challenges; otherwise the venire should be quashed. See McCray, 750 F.2d at
1113.
138. See supra notes 32-43 and accompanying text.
139. King, 581 F. Supp. at 499-502.
140. Id. at 499-500.
141. Id. The court stated that arguably the use of peremptory challenges enables the
jury to reach a unanimous verdict, obviating the necessity for a retrial. Furthermore, the
"selfish use of peremptory challenges tends in general to promote societal goals." Id. at
500.
142. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
143. See supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
144. For a comprehensive discussion of the state action requirement, see infra notes
253-89 and accompanying text.
145. 642 F. Supp. 760 (D. Conn. 1986).
146. Id. at 761.
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The court based its holding on two factors: first, there was
"[s]pecial consideration for the plight of the accused crimi-
nal";4 7 and second, "the complaining party [was] a civil plaintiff
who [had] chosen of his own free will to initiate judicial pro-
cess."" 8 Although the court recognized that Batson might apply
to civil matters generally, it refused to examine the issue directly
because the plaintiff had not established a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination. 1 9
The state action requirement was easily met in Clark v.
City of Bridgeport'"0 because the city, clearly a state actor, was
a defendant. 1 1 In Clark, three plaintiffs brought a section
1983151 claim against two police officers and the city.153 During
jury selection, the attorney for the city struck every black venire
person.1" The plaintiffs argued that the city had used its chal-
lenges to discriminate. 15
Holding that the use of peremptory challenges to strike the
black venire persons violated the equal protection clause, 1 5 the
147. Id.
148. Id. (emphasis omitted).
149. Id. Because the plaintiff in Esposito was not black, he could not establish that
he was a member of a cognizable racial group, see supra note 79, and that the defendants
had exercised peremptory strikes to remove venire members of his race.
150. 645 F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1986). For commentary on this decision, see Com-
ment, Vitiation of Peremptory Challenge in Civil Actions: Clark v. City of Bridgeport,
61 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 155 (1986).
151. For a discussion of whether state action exists when only private parties are
involved, see infra notes 253-89 and accompanying text.
152. In pertinent part, § 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute ... subjects ... any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
153. Clark actually consisted of three consolidated cases: Clark v. City of
Bridgeport; Rizzoli v. Muniz; Simmons v. Formichella.
154. Clark, 645 F. Supp. at 891-92.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 898. For one of the three plaintiffs, Rizzoli, a white man, this holding was
based upon "the totality of circumstances and inferences arising from the particular se-
ries of jury selections, and the inherent discriminatory nature of the use of the peremp-
tory [challenge] . I..." Id. at 897.
The Clark court held that the challenged black venire members suffered a violation
of equal protection. Id. at 891-94. The court stated that Batson applied to protect the
rights of the challenged potential jurors as much as it did to protect the rights of the
litigants. Id. The Clark court applied its "supervisory power" to reach this conclusion.
25
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court reviewed historical sources.1 57 It first cited Thiel v. South-
ern Pacific Co.,158 quoting its famous passage characterizing the
role of the American jury in both criminal and civil litigation.159
The court next considered a congressional enactment 60 con-
cerning jury selection in both civil and criminal cases, which re-
quires, among other things, that no citizen be excluded from
jury service based upon race. Conceding that the enactment was
not applicable in Clark,"1 the court stated that it did, however,
indicate "a clear Congressional policy that all citizens shall have
the right to be considered for jury service and all litigants shall
have the right to have these citizens so considered without re-
gard to their race.""6 2 Because the state action component was
readily satisfied, Clark became the first case to extend Batson to
civil litigation." The moment was now ripe to examine the
more difficult question of whether Batson is applicable to cases
involving solely private litigants. Indeed, only a few federal
courts have considered this issue to date. 14
The supervisory power of the court is "commonly viewed as a [discretionary] inherent
power to preserve the integrity of the judicial process." United States v. Ramirez, 710
F.2d 535, 541 (9th Cir. 1983). See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946), supra
notes 30-31 and accompanying text, in which the Court exercised its supervisory power
to prevent discrimination against prospective jurors in civil cases.
157. Clark, 645 F. Supp. at*894-96.
158. 328 U.S. 217 (1946). See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
159. Clark, 645 F. Supp. at 895. See supra note 31 and accompanying text for the
words of this celebrated passage.
160. 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1982) provides that "[n]o citizen shall be excluded from ser-
vice as a grand or petit juror in the district courts of the United States or in the Court of
International Trade on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic
status." Id.
161. The court stated that the statute was "inapplicable to the instant case, in that
it deals with the judicial machinery used to arrive at the venire [not the litigant's selec-
tion of the jury]." Clark, 645 F. Supp. at 896.
162. Id.
163. See also Reynolds v. City of Little Rock, 893 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1990), dis-
cussed infra note 183.
164. At least one state court has examined the extension of Batson to a civil action
between two private litigants. In Chavous v. Brown, 396 S.E.2d 98 (S.C. 1990), the South
Carolina Supreme Court held that Batson does not apply to civil cases. Id. at 99. Al-
though it did not "address the situation... where the State is a party," id. at 98 n.2, the
court refused to find state action when the proceedings involved only private entities. Id.
at 100. Further, the court did not find that the trial judge's involvement in the challeng-
ing process constituted state action. "(T]he trial judge performs merely a ministerial
function in excusing [prospective] jurors .... There is no judicial discretion involved."
Id. at 99.
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In Maloney v. Washington,'" four white police officers sued
the City of Chicago, former Mayor Washington, and other city
officials, alleging that they were demoted for racial and political
reasons. " In the first of two attempts at trial, the court refused
to impanel the jury because both sides had utilized their pe-
remptory challenges in a discriminatory manner. 16 7 The court
advised the parties, after the first failed attempt, that the princi-
ples espoused in Batson'" "would be applied . . . and that the
plaintiffs would be required to justify their use of peremptory
challenges against blacks and the defendants their Use of per-
emptories against whites." 169 Following the parties' challenges in
the second attempt at trial, the court again refused to impanel a
jury because of the improper use of peremptory challenges.17 0
The court reiterated that "Batson applies with equal force
and effect to jury selection in civil cases and to all the parties in
those cases, whether state actors or not.'' Deciding that both
parties had abused their peremptory challenges, the court
closely examined the use of the strikes in the second attempt to
select a jury.17 2 It then "concluded that racial discrimination
The trial judge's role in the peremptory challenge process has become a key issue in
the state action debate when only private litigants are involved. See infra notes 274-84
and accompanying text.
165. 690 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
166. Id. at 688-89.
167. Id. Each party exercised all of its challenges to remove potential jurors for ra-
cial reasons. Id.
168. See supra notes 61-106 and accompanying text.
169. Maloney, 690 F. Supp. at 688.
170. Id. at 688-89. The plaintiffs exercised three of their four challenges to remove
blacks and the defendants used all four of their challenges to remove whites. Id.
171. Id. at 689. The court reached this conclusion by examining the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 689-90. It also found the necessary state
action because the court administers the peremptory challenge process. Id. at 690. The
classification of the trial court as a state actor is discussed infra notes 274-84 and accom-
panying text.
172. Maloney, 690 F. Supp. at 690-91. The plaintiffs were asked to justify their chal-
lenges on non-racial grounds. The first black prospective juror was challenged because
she worked for the Urban League of Chicago and would perhaps be partial to the con-
cerns of minorities. Id. at 691. The court found the prospective juror non-biased, "yet
acknowledged that plaintiffs may have had a good faith basis for challenging this . . .
[person]." Id. The second black prospective juror was excused because she had previ-
ously been employed by the Chicago Police Department, and because her former super-
visor might be called as a witness at trial. Id. The court found this justification "spe-
cious." Id. "[P]olice officers are involved on both sides of this litigation ... [and the
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permeated the jury selection process . . . [because] both sides
had twice used their challenges almost exclusively along racial
lines - the second time in violation of the court's clear admo-
nition .... [Therefore, the] right to make peremptory challenges
[was] lost [for the third attempt at selecting a jury]. ' 17s The
court administered this sanction because both parties had "con-
sistently ignored the court's orders to select a jury without con-
sidering race, and because it [was] the most effective means of
ensuring an unbiased jury selection process. "174
In Wilson v. Cross,'7 5 a white owner of a roller skating rink
lost his section 1983176 suit against a number of police officers.'"
In this case, the plaintiff had conducted a promotion called
"soul night" in an attempt to attract a larger number of blacks
to his rink.7 8  He alleged that the officers conducted vehicle
prospective juror] testified she never heard of the 'supervisor'...." Id. The third black
prospective juror was removed because she "'lied' about having any prior trouble with
the law." Id. The prospective juror indicated on her questionnaire that she had no previ-
ous arrest record. Id. During the voir dire she admitted that she had been arrested for
disorderly conduct and fined $25. Id. The court found this reason "pretextual [because
the] plaintiffs had accepted several white jurors who had similarly been mistaken about
answers in the questionnaire and who had likewise amended those answers under ques-
tioning by the court." Id. The court was "not troubled by the fact that the plaintiffs did
permit one black prospective juror to survive the second selection process." Id.
Similarly, the defendants could not meet the burden required by the court.
All of their peremptory challenges were used against whites in both trials. How-
ever, they did permit some whites to survive their strikes - probably because it
was impossible, given the composition of the second venire (35 whites, 13 blacks, 1
Hispanic), to strike all of the white people. We further find the attempted justifi-
cations for the defendants' use of their peremptories to be less than satisfactory.
Id. at 691-92.
173. Id. at 692.
174. Id. Though the Maloney court withdrew the right to peremptorily challenge, it
did not discuss how the parties would be compensated for the removal of this important
device. See infra notes 309-32 and accompanying text for an exploration of alternatives
to the peremptory challenge. The Maloney court's purpose in removing the challenge
was a means of punishment and not a broad step toward addressing the discriminatory
jury selection problem.
175. 845 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1988).
176. See supra note 152 for the text of § 1983.
177. Cross was the second case heard involving the parties. In the first, Wilson v.
City of North Little Rock, 801 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1986), the court affirmed a directed
verdict for the defendant city and remanded for retrial the claims against the individual
officers. Upon retrial, the individual defendants were found not liable. Cross, 845 F.2d at
164.
178. Cross, 845 F.2d at 164.
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safety checks at a roadblock every time the promotion was held,
resulting in both harassment and inconvenience to his potential
black customers.179 The issue on appeal was the defendant's use
of peremptory challenges to exclude black venire persons. 180
As in Esposito,"1 the court did not directly address the jury
discrimination question because a white plaintiff was the com-
plaining party.18 2 Nevertheless, in dicta, the Wilson court indi-
cated it had "strong doubts about whether Batson was intended
to limit the use of peremptory strikes in civil cases . .. ."18
In direct contrast, the Eleventh Circuit, in Fludd v.
Dykes, 8" held that Batson5 5 does indeed extend to civil cases.18 6
Fludd arose out of a police shooting. 187 The plaintiff, Fludd,
sued Dykes, the county sheriff, and Tiller, the deputy sheriff,
contending that the shooting violated his constitutional rights.18 8
Fludd sought money damages under section 1983.1s9
Following the voir dire, the defendants peremptorily chal-
lenged the only two black prospective jurors, leaving an all-
white jury.1 90 The plaintiff, citing Batson, argued that the de-
fendants were required to offer "neutral explanations" for their
179. Id.
180. Id. A secondary issue on appeal concerned the jury instruction on the elements
of Wilson's constitutional claim. Id. at 165.
181. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
182. Wilson v. Cross, 845 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1988).
183. Id. at 164-65. See also Swapshire v. Baer, 865 F.2d 948, 954 (8th Cir. 1989)
(also expressing "strong doubts" as to the extension of Batson to civil cases). But see
Reynolds v. City of Little Rock, 893 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1990). In Reynolds, the plaintiff,
the administrator of the decedent's estate, claimed that police officers used excessive
force when they fatally shot a mentally disturbed black man waving a pocket knife at
them. Id. at 1005. The court held that the city's attorney had to offer neutral explana-
tions before peremptorily challenging the blacks on the venire because he represented
the police officers in their official capacities. Id. at 1008-09. "If the police officers ... had
been separately represented [by private counsel], . . . a different question might be
presented. We need not answer that now." Id. at 1009. See Clark v. City of Bridgeport,
645 F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1986), supra notes 150-63 and accompanying text, for a dis-
cussion of another civil action where the city used its peremptory challenges against
black venire members.
184. 863 F.2d 822 (11th Cir. 1989).
185. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
186. Fludd, 863 F.2d at 823-24.
187. Id. at 824.
188. Id.
189. Id. See supra note 152 for the pertinent text of § 1983.
190. Fludd, 863 F.2d at 823.
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peremptory strikes against the two potential black jurors.191 The
trial court overruled that objection, and the jury subsequently
rendered a verdict in favor of both defendants.1" Fludd
appealed. 98
The Eleventh Circuit began its opinion by reviewing the
historical decisions concerning the equal protection clause and
discriminatory jury selection practices.1 9" It then examined the
means by which an equal protection violation can be demon-
strated when no apparent state action exists.19s It considered the
trial judge to be the discriminatory state actor "even when the
decision to exclude blacks may have originated in another state
entity, such as the legislature."1 96 The court concluded that the
"judge's decision - to proceed to trial, over [Fludd's objec-
tion], with a jury selected . . .on the basis of race - is [the
functional equivalent of state action]. ''"97 Indeed, this court
found that in such a situation "the judge becomes guilty of the
sort of discriminatory conduct that the equal protection clause
proscribes. '" 19'
Although the court affirmed the verdict in favor of Dykes, 99
191. Id. Batson, tried in a state court because the defendant was charged under the
Kentucky penal law, was decided upon fourteenth amendment equal protection grounds.
See supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text. Fludd, tried in federal district court as a
federal question case pursuant to § 1983, applied the fifth amendment due process
clause. Fludd, 863 F.2d at 824. The fifth amendment contains no semantic equivalent to
the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. In reaching its holding, the court
implied that the two clauses parallel each other in the protection they provide. Id. In-
deed, it is well settled that the two clauses are equivalent. See Johnson v. Robison, 415
U.S. 361, 364 n.4 (1974).
Although the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid
discrimination that is so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.... Thus, if
a classification would be invalid under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, it is also inconsistent with the due process requirement of the
Fifth Amendment.
Id.
192. Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822, 823 (11th Cir. 1989).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 824-28.
195. Id. at 828. The defendants argued "that the equal protection clause is inappli-
cable to a civil suit," id., because no state prosecutor is involved. Id. The court disagreed
with the defendants' contention. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 828-29.
199. Id. at 824. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court directed a verdict
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it remanded the matter concerning Tiller for a determination of
whether the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of jury
discrimination.200
The most definitive decision to date examining Batson's ex-
tension to civil litigation is the case of Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co.2 0 1 In Edmonson, the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc
succinctly phrased the issue as:
[W]hether a private litigant in a federal civil case who challenges
a venire member peremptorily can be made to give reasons for his
action. Specifically, we must determine whether he can be re-
quired to do so when his opposing party is a black person and the
venireman stricken is black, so as to rebut the inference that he
exercised the strike because of the would-be juror's ethnic
group.20 2
In Edmonson, a black man filed a negligence claim against
Leesville in a federal district court.2 0 a The plaintiff used all three
of his peremptory challenges to remove white venire persons.' "
Leesville used its challenges to strike two white and one black
venire persons. 20 5 The plaintiff, citing Batson, requested that the
trial court require Leesville to articulate a "neutral explanation"
as to why it had exercised its challenges.2° The trial court de-
nied the request on the ground that Batson was not applicable
to civil actions. It then impaneled a jury consisting of eleven
whites and one black.20 7 The jury returned a verdict in favor of
the plaintiff.208 However, the damage award was reduced be-
cause the jury found Edmonson eighty percent comparatively
in favor of Dykes concluding that Fludd had failed to establish any wrongdoing on
Dykes' part. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Id.
200. Id. at 829.
201. 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990). See also
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1988) (Batson is applicable
to civil litigation), for the earlier Fifth Circuit decision in this case before the rehearing
en banc.
202. Edmonson, 895 F.2d at 218-19.
203. Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1309-10.
204. Id. at 1310.
205. Id.
206. Id. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "neu-
tral explanation" standard.





negligent.209 Edmonson appealed to the Fifth Circuit, seeking a
new trial, alleging that Leesville had utilized its strikes in a dis-
criminatory fashion.1 0
On rehearing, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's rul-
ing, holding that Batson does not apply to civil suits.211 The
court reached this conclusion based upon two reasons:
[T]he mechanical one, that state action is not present in a case as
this; and the logical one, that striking a venireman in a civil case
because you fear he may tend to favor your opponent over you
neither demeans him nor calls in question the fairness of the civil
justice system.212
In its examination of the state action question, the Fifth
Circuit applied the two-step test articulated by the Supreme
Court in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. 211 The court conceded
that the first step of Lugar had been met. Specifically, "the
claimed deprivation [the removal of black prospective jurors] re-
sulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source
in governmental authority [the peremptory challenge stat-
ute]."21 However, the court did not find "the presence of some
figure who can fairly be characterized as a state actor."21
The court quickly rejected the notion that the trial judge
acted on behalf of the state. 16
The merely ministerial function exercised by the judge in simply
permitting the venire members cut by counsel to depart is an ac-
tion so minimal in nature that one of less significance can scarcely
be imagined. No exercise of judicial discretion is involved, rather
a mere standing aside; so that the fault - if it is fault - lies
209. Id. The total damage award was $90,000, but the plaintiff only recovered
$18,000 because of his negligence. Id.
210. Id.
211. Edmonson, 895 F.2d at 219.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 221. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), discussed
infra notes 262-84 and accompanying text.
214. Edmonson, 895 F.2d at 221.
215. Id. In Batson, discussed supra notes 61-106 and accompanying text, state ac-
tion was obviously present. "[T]here the entire proceeding was commenced and carried
through by the prosecuting attorney, the very embodiment of the state's power, acting in
the direct interest of its most fundamental function, maintaining law and order." Ed-
monson, 895 F.2d at 221.
216. Edmonson, 895 F.2d at 221.
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with the system which permits such challenges, not with the
judge's mere ministerial compliance with what the rule
requires."' 7
The court believed that if the judge was deemed a state actor by
merely excusing the stricken venire persons, "it follows that
every aspect of every civil trial [is state action] - a quantum
procedural leap that we leave for the Supreme Court to make,
should it wish to do so.'2218
Similarly, the court made short work of the notion that pri-
vately retained counsel may be characterized as state actors.2 e
It likened the private attorney's relationship with the state to
that of the public defender - who was previously declared not
to be a state actor by the Supreme Court.22 0 "[The private attor-
ney] is licensed by the State; not, however, for its benefit but in
the hope of insuring a minimum degree of competence to his
clients. Like the public defender, it is their interests, their parti-
san interests, which he serves [and not the state's concerns].22 1
The court turned next to the logical reason for affirming the
trial court's decision not to extend Batson to civil actions. The
majority found the unrestricted peremptory challenge to be "of
greater significance in federal court [civil] proceedings than in
[state court civil proceedings], for there the attorney's role in
jury selection is [more limited]. It then embarked upon an
217. Id. at 221-22 (footnotes omitted).
218. Id. at 222. Indeed, Judge Gee, writing for the Edmonson majority, distin-
guished between the state's interest in civil litigation and criminal litigation. "[Iln the
former case [the state] simply furnishes a level playing field for dispute resolution in the
name of civic peace, in the latter it is the instigator and actor, with powerful interests of
its own at stake." Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981), infra note 272 and accom-
panying text.
221. Edmonson, 895 F.2d at 222 (emphasis in original).
222. Id. at 223. Indeed, in most federal court trials the voir dire is conducted en-
tirely by the judge. See infra notes 315-17 and accompanying text.
As was seen in Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822 (11th Cir. 1989), discussed supra notes
184-200 and accompanying text, the court had to draw a parallel between the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause, applicable to the states, and the fifth amendment's
due process clause, applicable to the federal government, before a theoretical extension
of Batson could be made to a federal court proceeding. The first Fifth Circuit panel in
Edmonson accomplished this through analogy of the two clauses. "[T]he due process
clause implies a [fourteenth amendment-]like guarantee against the denial of equal pro-
tection of the laws of the federal government." Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1310. See also
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elaborate discussion of the peremptory challenge in criminal, as
opposed to civil, matters. It concluded that the state's interest in
criminal matters was vastly different from its concern in the civil
realm, where the "state has no purpose at all... beyond pre-
empting the use of private force to settle disputes ..... I'l The
court continued that in a civil trial the striking of a potential
juror for racial reasons may even be appropriate in certain cir-
cumstances and is, therefore, not necessarily demeaning to
him.22 4
The Edmonson majority distinguished the purpose of the
state prosecutor and criminal jury from that of the civil advo-
cate and jury. According to the court, the criminal jury "is a cen-
tral feature of the... system, .. . hold[ing] not only fact-finding
powers but ... [also the] power to pardon. '2 2 5 The prosecutor's
objective must be to further justice.22 On the other hand, the
civil jury functions only in a fact-finding capacity and is prima-
rily limited to economic issues of far less consequence than the
life and liberty at stake in a criminal trial.227 The civil advocate,
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir.
1976).
223. Edmonson, 895 F.2d at 223.
224. Id. at 224. The majority believed that the removal of black venire persons in
criminal trials was repugnant to the Constitution. Id. "[Ulnequal treatment of citizens
on the ground of race ... is insulting - even the suggestion that one is unfit to dis-
charge a civic duty for that reason." Id. However, in civil matters it was not shameful nor
undignified to be challenged because of race. Id. The court supported its logic with color-
ful hypotheticals:
[F]or obvious reasons counsel representing a defendant airline in a damage suit
might well peremptorily challenge a black airline pilot who was himself on strike
for higher wages against another airline. Such a challenge, based upon an assumed
animosity toward his client, clearly raises no equal protection problems, even
though the venireman stricken is black .... [Also,] a well-known member of the
Ku Klux Klan in an action for, say, breach of contract by a white plaintiff might
strike any black veniremen whom he had been unable to convince the judge to
excuse for cause, not for any ethnic inferiority, but rather on the prudential
ground of probable hostility.... Such an action does not demean the stricken
subject; it merely recognizes a probable fact of life.
Id. This differentiation between civil and criminal proceedings was essentially a matter
of public policy. "[W]e think [it is] sound policy that requires the state to conform to
stricter standards and appearances in dealing with its citizens than are demanded of
those citizens in their dealings with each other." Id. at 225.
225. Id. at 225.
226. Id.
227. Id. See infra notes 232-48 and accompanying text for a further discussion of
the differences between the criminal and civil trial systems.
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unlike the prosecutor, is involved in "a fight [and] [i]t is [his]
first imperative ... to see that it is his side that wins.","8
The majority concluded with a jab at the Batson decision
itself, finding that a double standard may be employed when a
white venire person was challenged.2 9 "It is not for us to quarrel
with ... [the] Batson [Court's] reconfiguration of the peremp-
tory, but we decline to extend its strictures on this ancient right
into the civil area, where the considerations... , if present at
all, [are] far weaker than in the criminal field. 23 0
Although most of the federal circuits have still not been
heard from on this issue, a conflict nonetheless exists. This lack
of uniformity can be attributed to the Supreme Court's failure
to offer guidance, not only concerning the extension of Batson,
228. Edmonson, 895 F.2d at 226. The court was quick to point out that zealousness
must be balanced by "fair and ethical conduct." Id.
229. Id. The court's disfavor of Batson stems from the reality that a black defend-
ant challenging a white venire person may be able to strike the prospective juror without
much reaction from the judge. To understand this apparent "discrimination in reverse,"
two concepts must be developed. First, the cognizable group must be defined. See supra
note 79. Second, and incorporating the first, the judicially created concept of a "multi-
tiered" equal protection analysis must be examined. Historically, and for reasons of po-
licy, significant deference is given to social welfare and economic legislation provided
there exists some rational relation between the means and the end. See, e.g., New York
Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
It is conceivable that this "rational basis" approach may apply when the affected
party (the white venire person) does not have the distinguishing and immutable charac-
teristics of a "suspect class," or more precisely in this instance - the cognizable group.
The suspect class/cognizable group requirement signals to the Court that a higher stan-
dard of equal protection analysis must be applied. This is called "strict scrutiny." See L.
TRIRE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-6 (1978).
Accordingly, therefore, this court-made differentiation, when applied to the peremp-
tory challenge process, holds strikes by a white litigant under strict scrutiny, with a pre-
sumption of discriminatory intent. Conversely, the black litigant's challenges may escape
this "grilling," because it is problematical whether the deprived party in this case, the
white venire person, will be deemed to be a member of a suspect class/cognizable group.
Such a distinction, however, may prove to be splitting hairs. Indeed, at least one federal
court treated the discriminatory antics of both the white and black litigants in the same
fashion. See Maloney v. Washington, 690 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Iln. 1988), discussed supra
notes 165-74 and accompanying text.
To further complicate matters, the Supreme Court has enlarged its own doctrine to
include "heightened scrutiny." This middle-level analysis is predominantly applied to
gender-based discrimination. Though beyond the scope of this Comment, as a matter of
interest, the reader is referred to G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET,
CONsTrruTIONAL LAW 610-52 (1986). See also Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior
Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
230. Edmonson, 895 F.2d at 226.
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but to the very foundations of jury selection in civil trials as
well.
III. Analysis
It was hardly prophetic to reason that the question of the
extension of Batson v. Kentucky to civil litigation would drop
on the collective laps of the Justices of the Supreme Court. As
Judge Gee of the Fifth Circuit articulated, "it is unlikely that
the Court will leave such an issue as this dangling."' 23 1 While
there is no doubt concerning the need for major reform in civil
trial jury selection, this Comment proposes that Batson is not
the solution. Why Batson fails in civil litigation and what can be
done to amend this system is the subject of the remainder of
this Comment.
A. The Criminal Defendant Versus the Civil Litigant: Has the
Criminal Defendant More at Stake?
The right to use the peremptory challenge is not guaranteed
by the Constitution,282 but is granted by statute in both criminal
and civil litigation. 83 It has been argued that the peremptory
challenge is not essential in providing for a fair trial by an im-
partial jury.2 84 Some scholars have even proposed that the pe-
remptory challenge be eradicated entirely from the American
justice system. 28 5
231. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 1308, 1315 (5th Cir. 1988) (Gee,
J., dissenting). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to
the Edmonson case. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990).
232. "There is nothing in the Constitution of the United States which requires the
Congress [or the states] to grant peremptory challenges." Stilson v. United States, 250
U.S. 583, 586 (1919).
233. See 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1982) for civil trials, and FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b) for crimi-
nal trials.
234. See Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 505 n.11 (1948).
235. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring), dis-
cussed supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text; Alschuler, The Supreme Court and
the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHL
L. RE v. 153 (1989).
At least one state has introduced a bill calling for the elimination of the peremptory
challenge in all forms of litigation. In 1974, the Massachusetts House of Representatives
examined, but did not pass, such legislation at the urging of the Chief Justice of the
Suffolk County Superior Court. The bill had the support of the state bar on the condi-
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Such sweeping assertions cannot be dismissed lightly. How-
ever, in criminal matters in which the stakes are greater, the pe-
remptory challenge serves to "eliminate extremes of partiality
on both sides, [and to] assure the parties that the jurors . . . will
decide on the basis of evidence before them, and not
otherwise. 28 6
To accomplish this purpose, the peremptory challenge ful-
fills functions that the challenge for cause cannot.2 37 First and
foremost, the peremptory challenge sends a message to the com-
munity that the jury system is fair and proper because it is the
litigant herself who chooses the jury. Through the exercise of pe-
remptory challenges, she removes those prospective jurors she
considers to be incapable of candor.23 Secondly, the didactic na-
ture of the peremptory challenge permits the subtle dismissal of
potential jurors without stereotypical references to race, even
though such "type-casting" may be justified in a particular
case.
2 89
If the use of the peremptory challenge is akin to "playing
with fire,"24 0 the arena in which it is exercised must be worth the
risk. A criminal proceeding, unlike its civil counterpart, provides
just such a setting. The issues at stake in a criminal trial far
outweigh those in a civil action, even though civil actions often
involve important property rights.24 1 The historical importance
tion that lawyers would be allowed to conduct the voir dire questioning, which at the
time was done by judges. J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 169 (1977).
236. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
237. See supra note 1 for a definition of the challenge for cause. See also Babcock,
Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power", 27 STAN. L. REv. 545, 550 (1975).
238. Babcock, supra note 237, at 552. The peremptory challenge permits the dismis-
sal of those prospective jurors feared by the litigant, leaving the litigant and the commu-
nity with "a good opinion of the jury." Id.
239. Id. at 553. Professor Babcock warned the following colloquy might occur if pe-
remptory challenges were not part of the justice system:
Your honor, my client is a 20-year-old black "dude" who has never held a job and
is wearing $100 shoes. I move to strike for cause all black men over 45 who hold
jobs as porters, janitors, or grade-level fives or lower in the government on the
ground that they will be biased against my client.
Id. See also J. VAN DYKE, supra note 235, at 146.
240. Even Blackstone recognized the possible danger of the challenge but added
that it preserves the appearance and substance of impartiality by guaranteeing that the
defendant will not be tried by anyone whom he intuitively dislikes. 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 346 (1st Eng. ed. 1769).
241. "[V]astly different things are at stake in criminal trials ... where liberty and
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attached to the criminal trial system in this country supports
this assertion.
First, criminal verdicts must be unanimous, while many ju-
risdictions permit divided jury verdicts in civil cases.242 Second,
the sixth amendment of the Constitution guarantees the defend-
ant the right to counsel.24 No such provision is contained in the
seventh amendment, the civil action counterpart to the sixth
amendment.2" Third, while a jury trial is required in most crim-
inal cases,245 it must often be requested by civil litigants in the
pleadings.246
The judicial system's greater protection of criminal defend-
ants is not startling. After all, it is the criminal defendant who is
dragged into court "unwillingly" to face potential incarceration
or loss of life. 47 The civil defendant, although arguably in a po-
sition similar to that of the criminal defendant, does not risk
losing life or liberty.
For these reasons, Batson248 provides appropriate standards
under which the use of peremptory challenges in criminal mat-
ters may be restricted. The danger of potential misuse of the
even life are at stake." Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 225 (5th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990). See generally D. DOBBS, REMEDIES §§ 5.1-
5.16 (1973) for a discussion of particular property rights and specialized remedies avail-
able to civil litigants concerning these rights.
242. See, e.g., Holley v. J & S Sweeping Co., 143 Cal. App. 3d 588, 192 Cal. Rptr. 74
(1983), discussed supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text. The California Constitu-
tion provides that "[tirial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all, but in a
civil cause three-fourths of the jury may render a verdict." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16.
243. "[T]he accused ... [shall] have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI. See also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
244. The full text of the seventh amendment states:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dol-
lars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall
be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the'
rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
245. The Supreme Court has made a distinction between so-called "serious crimes"
and "petty offenses," where the latter may be tried without a jury. See Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66, 70 (1970); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968).
246. See FED. R. Civ. P. 38(b) - Jury Trial of Right. "Any party may demand a
trial by jury of any issue .. .by serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in
writing ...." See also FED. R. Civ. P. 39(b) - Trial by Jury or by the Court. "[T]he
court in its discretion ... may order a trial by a jury . ..."
247. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 1308, 1313 (5th Cir. 1988).
248. See supra notes 61-106 and accompanying text.
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peremptory challenge must be weighed against the criminal de-
fendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury. As such, the
use of this powerful tool is appropriate in criminal actions.
Under the watchful eye of Batson, the peremptory challenge can
be both effective and efficient. But what if we venture to apply
Batson to civil proceedings? Are there constitutional obstacles
to such an extension? Is there another solution to the discrimi-
natory jury selection problem in civil litigation?
B. What Should Become of the Civil Litigant?
While few would dispute that the jury selection system in
civil trials is in need of amelioration, there is no consensus of
opinion as to the means for addressing this problem.2 49 Certainly
the most obvious approach would be to extend the criteria de-
veloped in Batson v. Kentucky2 50 to civil litigation.2 51 However,
this is comparable to forcing a square peg into a round hole.
Stated simply, it does not work. Furthermore, the very nature of
the peremptory challenge is volatile, and in cases in which only
property rights are imperiled,252 the opportunity that the chal-
lenge provides for discriminatory jury strikes makes it an unnec-
essary risk to the right of an impartial jury trial.
1. Why Batson Would Not Work in Civil Litigation
The analysis as to why Batson cannot be extended is three
tiered. First, no state action exists in a civil trial involving only
private parties, even though the court has arguably sanctioned
discriminatory peremptory strikes by one or more of the liti-
249. See, e.g., Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease but Killing the Pa-
tient, 1987 SuP. CT. REV. 97, 119 (arguing that Batson can be applied to the government's
use of peremptory strikes in some civil actions); Note, The Civil Implications of Batson
v. Kentucky and State v. Gilmore: A Further Look at Limitations on the Peremptory
Challenge, 40 RUTGERs L. REV. 891 (1988) (arguing that Batson is applicable to all civil
actions). But see Fleming v. Moore, 479 U.S. 890 (1986) (denying certiorari to a peti-
tioner seeking to raise the issue of the extension of Batson to civil actions - discussed
in 55 U.S.L.W. 3100 (1986)); Comment, Vitiation of Peremptory Challenge in Civil Ac-
tions: Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 155 (1986) (arguing that Batson
should not be extended and that the stricter Swain criteria should be adhered to).
250. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). See supra notes 61-106 and accompanying text.
251. See, e.g., Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822 (11th Cir. 1989), discussed supra notes
184-200 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 232-48 and accompanying text.
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gants. Second, Batson, a criminal case, was not premised upon
the seventh amendment. Assuming, arguendo, that the sixth and
seventh amendments are parallel in all respects, the extension of
Batson still cannot be justified because the seventh amendment
is not applicable to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment. Lastly, the Batson Court was silent on its application to
civil matters.
a. The State Action Dilemma
The equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth amend-
ment does not prohibit discrimination between private parties.
Rather, it forbids the state from "deny[ing] to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 2 53 Fre-
quently, however, it is difficult to discern a bright line separation
between private and state action.25' To apply Batson to civil
matters, though, this distinction must be made in order to
demonstrate a violation of equal protection.2 55
The Supreme Court has endeavored to distinguish the two.
The Court has said that "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing
circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the state in
private conduct be attributed its true significance. ' 2"I Arguably,
therefore, state action is present when conduct deprives an indi-
vidual of a federal right and that conduct is attributed to the
state.257
In Shelley v. Kraemer,58 the Court held that racially re-
strictive covenants between private property owners are not ju-
253. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
254. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 1308, 1311 (5th Cir. 1988).
255. Ironically, Batson was decided on equal protection grounds though Batson's
counsel never raised the issue on certiorari. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 109
(1986) (Stevens, J., concurring). Instead, Batson argued that the prosecution had used its
peremptory challenges to exclude blacks in violation of his sixth and fourteenth amend-
ment rights to an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community. Id. at 84
n.4.
Perhaps foreshadowing its decision in Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986), the
Court declined to discuss Batson's sixth amendment claims. Batson, 476 U.S. at 84 n.4.
In Lockhart, the Court held that in a capital case the removal of jurors strongly opposed
to the death penalty was not a violation of the defendant's sixth amendment rights.
Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 165.
256. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723 (1961).
257. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
258. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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dicially enforceable because these covenants violate the equal
protection clause.2  Upholding such agreements by "judicial of-
ficers in' their capacities is to be regarded as action of the
State."206 Arguably, according to the Shelley analysis, the sup-
port of the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by the
trial judge may also be deemed state action. However, the legacy
of Shelley has taught differently. The decision has not been ex-
pansively read. " 1
The leading contemporary case attributing the actions of
private persons to the state is Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. 26 2 In
Lugar, the defendant creditor, Edmondson Oil, invoked a state
attachment statute.2 ' 8 Lugar successfully avoided the attach-
ment because Edmondson Oil had not complied with the statu-
tory prerequisites.2 6' Lugar then filed suit under section 1983,
alleging that Edmondson Oil and the state had acted jointly to
deprive him of his property without due process of law.26
The Court formulated a two-tiered inquiry into whether
state action is present when a private person(s) invokes a state
259. Id.
260. Id. at 14.
261. The Shelley decision did not render "every instance of judicial cognition of
private discrimination . . . state action prohibited by the fourteenth (or fifth) amend-
ment." Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor
Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12 (1959); see also McCoy, Current State Action Theo-
ries, the Jackson Nexus Requirement, and Employee Discharges by Semi-Public and
State-Aided Institutions 31 VAND. L. REV. 785, 792-803 (1978). Professor McCoy wrote:
[T]he Shelley doctrine is applicable only when the private right is asserted as part
of the cause of action and not when it is asserted by way of defense; that is appli-
cable only when the private contractual right impacts on a third party .... Shel-
ley is really a case concerning the assumption of municipal zoning powers by pri-
vate parties rather than one of judicial enforcement of private rights.
Id. at 793 (footnotes omitted). See also Schneider, State Action - Making Sense out of
Chaos - An Historical Approach, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 737, 754-55 (1985). Professor
Schneider opined:
[T]he Court... has not taken Shelley to its theoretical limits. By the 1960's, the
Court no longer cited Shelley in cases to which it was relevant, at least with re-
gard to its holding that judicial enforcement of private action transformed the
latter into state action. Other indicia of state involvement would be necessary to
justify a finding of state action.
Id. at 754-55 (footnotes omitted).
262. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
263. Id. at 924.
264. Id. at 940-41.
265. Id. at 940-42.
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sanctioned procedure. "[T]he first question is whether the
claimed deprivation has resulted from the exercise of a right or
privilege having its source in state authority.""2 6 The second in-
quiry is whether under the facts of the case, the private per-
son(s) "may be appropriately characterized as 'state actors.' "267
If this test is applied to the peremptory challenge proce-
dure, the answer to the first question is probably yes.2 '68 The pe-
remptory challenge, while not guaranteed by the Constitution, 69
is granted by statute.2 7 0 But the answer to the second question is
not as clear. Certainly, if a state attorney is involved, no ques-
tion exists as to the state actor.2 7 1 However, public defenders are
not state actors even though they are employed by the state.272
Thus, privately retained attorneys, and certainly private liti-
gants, cannot be characterized as state actors either.27
The issue that remains, then, is whether, in the context of
the peremptory challenge procedure, the trial judge can be char-
acterized as a state actor. If so, both parts of the Lugar test are
satisfied. If she is not jointly participating with the state, no
state action is present and consequently no violation of equal
protection can be found.274 The issue becomes whether her role
266. Id. at 939.
267. Id. Applying this formulation, the Court held that Lugar had presented a valid
§ 1983 claim insofar as he challenged the constitutionality of the state attachment stat-
ute. Id. at 942. Edmondson Oil was characterized as a state actor on the basis of its
participation in the deprivation process. Id. at 940-42. Thus, Lugar was deprived of his
property through state action. Id.
268. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 1308, 1315 (5th Cir. 1988)
(Gee, J., dissenting) ("[I]t would be difficult to maintain that the strikes exercised by
counsel ... [do] not constitute the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in
state authority.") (citation omitted).
269. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
270. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-241 (West 1985); N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. §
4109 (McKinney 1989); supra note 233 and accompanying text.
271. See Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1986), discussed
supra notes 150-63 and accompanying text.
272. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981), supra note 220 and accompa-
nying text.
273. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 222 (5th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990).
274. Certainly, the judge is a state actor when performing within the "scope" of her
judicial responsibilities. For example, ruling on the admissibility of evidence and in-
structing the jury on the law are considered within the scope. A great degree of intent
and thought must be utilized by the judge in these jurisprudential matters. But is not
the judge's role in the peremptory challenge process one of inaction thereby raising
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is passive in the challenging process.
A trial judge cannot be characterized as a state actor in the
context of the peremptory challenge procedure because her ac-
tions are "minimal. ' 275 She performs a mere ministerial function
by permitting the venire members rejected by counsel to depart
from the courtroom.7 6 No judgment or discretion is required. 77
In Blum v. Yaretsky,2 7 8 the Court pronounced:
[A] state normally can be held responsible for a private decision
only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such
significant encouragement ... that the choice must ... be
deemed that of the state [and that] mere approval of or acquies-
cence in the initiatives of a private party is not sufficient to jus-
tify holding the state responsible for those initiatives under the
.. . fourteenth amendment.2 79
In Lugar,8 0 such coercive power was evident. An attach-
ment proceeding is a state sanctioned means of acquiring the
property of another to satisfy a debt or to pressure the debtor
into finding alternate means to meet his creditor's demands."'
In the exercise of peremptory challenges by private litigants, co-
ercive authority is not present. The challenge is utilized entirely
by the party, without any judicial assistance or encouragement
whatsoever. 82 Moreover, the Lugar Court limited its holding to
the "particular context of prejudgment attachment. ' 283 There-
doubts as to whether the jurist is performing at all, let alone performing within the scope
of her judicial responsibilities? See generally Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (dis-
cussing absolute immunity from suit granted to state court judges when acting within
the scope of judicial responsibilities).
275. Edmonson, 895 F.2d at 221.
276. Id. See also Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory
Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 HARV. L. REV. 808, 819
(1989). After all, the nature of the peremptory challenge allows the litigant to remove a
potential juror on a mere whim, without any judicial input. See supra note 1 for a dis-
cussion of how the peremptory challenge is utilized.
277. Edmonson, 895 F.2d at 221-22. See supra note 274.
278. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
279. Id. at 1001. This language was quoted in Edmonson, 895 F.2d at 221-22.
280. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
281. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 126 (6th ed. 1990) (the writ of attachment,
strictly governed by state statute, is utilized to secure the creditor's claim in the event of
a judgment against the debtor).
282. See Goldwasser, supra note 276, at 817 n.52.
283. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 n.21 (1982).
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fore, while in Batson it was quite obvious that the state actor
was the prosecutor, in a civil trial context no action can be fairly
attributed to the state.284
The last state action theory worthy of mention is the "pub-
lic function" doctrine .28  Applying this doctrine, courts impose
constitutional restrictions on private parties performing state
functions, thereby preventing the state from avoiding its consti-
tutional responsibilities.2 6 Under this theory, the appropriate
method of determining whether state action is present is to ana-
lyze the totality of the circumstances. If the peremptory chal-
lenge process is a state function assigned to a private individual,
then the litigant who exercises it is a state actor. 87
This approach, however, is too simplistic. The question is
not whether the peremptory challenge is a state function, but
whether the state's function is to fulfill its constitutional duty to
provide an impartial jury. Obviously, the answer to this question
is yes. The peremptory challenge is often the means of perform-
ing that function.2 8 The litigant operates within the constitu-
tional bounds administered by the state. In this forum, she may
challenge prospective jurors whom she considers biased, or she
may accept the impaneled jury, declining to challenge. Whatever
her choice, the state has not delegated any function to her, but
rather has permitted the litigant to achieve that which must be
secured by the state: the right to an impartial jury.28
Thus, applying Batson to civil actions is extremely trouble-
some. It is not an appropriate standard in civil matters. The re-
284. Id. at 937. Unless the private party can be shown to be a state actor, no degree
of state involvement will result in the finding of state action. Id.
285. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18-5 (1978).
286. See Note, Discrimination by the Defense: Peremptory Challenges After Bat-
son v. Kentucky, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 355, 360 (1988); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932)
(a Texas political party rule that permitted only whites to vote in a state primary was
declared unconstitutional state action even though an actual state law with the same
objective had been invalidated by the Court some years earlier).
287. See Note, The Civil Implications of Batson v. Kentucky and State v. Gilmore,
supra note 249, at 951.
288. See supra notes 236-39 and accompanying text.
289. In fact, the Edmonson court examined the public function theory from a differ-
ent angle, looking at the attorney himself rather than the peremptory challenge device.
The court could not conceive of any public function served by privately retained counsel
in a civil suit. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 222 (5th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990).
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quirement of state action necessary for a violation of equal pro-
tection under the fourteenth amendment, upon which Batson
was founded, cannot be satisfied. State action is not, however,
the only troublesome consideration in extending Batson to civil
litigation.
b. The Seventh Amendment Hitch
The Batson decision was not based upon the sixth 9 0 or the
seventh amendment; it was based upon fourteenth amendment
grounds.2 91 Before Batson, many courts relied upon sixth
amendment and state constitutional grounds to require that a
jury in a criminal trial reflect a cross-section of the commu-
nity.29 2 A clever alternative to the harsh Swain standard, 2 3 this
subtle circumventing of Swain was permitted for two reasons:
first, the sixth amendment applies to the states through the
fourteenth amendment;29' and second, state constitutional guar-
antees may exceed those of the Federal Constitution.2 e5 How-
ever, as was stated previously, the seventh amendment has not
been applied to the states by the fourteenth amendment.
296
290. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
292. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978),
discussed supra notes 44-60 and accompanying text; McCray v. Abrams, 576 F. Supp.
1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984), discussed supra notes 61 & 137
and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 32-43 and accompanying text.
294. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968).
295. See supra note 89.
296. There is much case law that supports this. In Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90,
92 (1875), the Court stated: "A trial by jury in suits at common law pending in the State
courts is not . . . a privilege . . . which the States are forbidden by the Fourteenth
Amendment to abridge."
Almost a half century later, the Court in Minnesota & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis,
241 U.S. 211 (1916) asserted:
[T]he Seventh [amendment is] not concerned with state action and deal[s] only
with Federal action .... [a]nd... [it] applies only in proceedings in courts of the
United States and does not in any manner whatever govern or regulate trials by
jury in state courts or the standards which must be applied concerning the same.
Id. at 216.
More recently, the Fifth Circuit reiterated the historical precedent in Woods v. Holy
Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1979). "While state laws are subjected to federal
equal protection ... requirements of the fourteenth amendment .... the seventh amend-
ment right to jury trial does not apply in state court." Id. at 1171 n.12.
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The seventh amendment guarantees to civil litigants the
same right that the sixth amendment grants to criminal defend-
ants - the right to an impartial jury trial.2 97 However, Batson
requires fourteenth amendment state action, and because the
civil litigant is protected by the "incompatible" seventh, 29  it is
conceivable that in a state civil trial, Batson would not apply.2 99
c. The Extension of Batson to Civil Litigation: Is the
Silence Deafening?
"This case requires us to reexamine ... the evidentiary bur-
den placed on a criminal defendant . . . ."00 With these words,
Justice Powell introduced the Batson majority opinion. The
Batson Court held only that "the state's privilege to strike indi-
vidual [prospective] jurors through peremptory challenges, is
subject to . . . the Equal Protection Clause."301 The Court re-
served comment on whether these restrictions also apply to the
defense. s 2 No mention of its application to civil litigation was
297. See supra note 18.
298. Although Batson was a criminal case, it was not based upon the sixth amend-
ment; rather, it was decided upon the fourteenth amendment, see supra notes 87-96 and
accompanying text. However, the fourteenth amendment incorporates the sixth amend-
ment, see supra note 294 and accompanying text. Therefore, the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Batson was not only logical, but intellectually "honest" as well.
The application of the Batson holding to civil matters, however, is an entirely differ-
ent story. Certainly, one could argue that Batson applies to state civil trials as it does to
state criminal matters, provided the same basic element is present - fourteenth
amendment state action. But this analogy is flawed. Unlike the sixth and fourteenth
amendments, no connection exists between the seventh and fourteenth amendments. See
supra note 296 and accompanying text. As a result, the extension of Batson to state civil
actions may very well be intellectually "dishonest."
299. The seventh amendment does, of course, readily apply to civil cases in federal
court because the fifth amendment due process clause provides litigants with the same
equal protection guarantees in federal court that the fourteenth amendment offers liti-
gants in state court. See supra notes 191 & 222. Batson, therefore, could be applied in
this situation assuming the state action hurdle is overcome.
Obviously, this is highly inequitable and would create an even greater burden on the
federal court system. Why sue in state court, if an action can be brought in federal court
with possibly greater constitutional protection?
300. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82 (1986) (emphasis added).
301. Id. at 89 (emphasis added).
302. "We express no views on whether the Constitution imposes any limit on the
exercise of peremptory challenges by defense counsel." Id. at 89 n.12. One state court has
since extended Batson to the defense. See People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 554 N.E.2d
1235, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1990) (applying Batson and state constitutional grounds to re-
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made by the Court.
In sum, because the Court did not even consider the most
logical extension of Batson - to the criminal defendant - the
interpretation that the Court implicitly supported the applica-
tion of Batson to civil litigation is improper.
The Batson decision is incompatible with the civil justice
system. It fails on constitutional grounds under the fourteenth
amendment because, first, there is no state action, and second,
the seventh amendment does not apply to the states. Further-
more, it falls short on the subtle grounds of judicial interpreta-
tion. Thus, another response to the jury selection problem must
be developed.
2. Solution: Elimination of the Peremptory Challenge
from Civil Litigation
The peremptory challenge in American jurisprudence is a
product of the English system.303 The English have since "abol-
ished the use of peremptory challenges in the few civil trials that
use juries." 0 " It should not be shocking, then, to suggest that we
again follow the English lead and abolish the use of peremptory
challenges in civil actions.305 Batson v. Kentucky is not the an-
swer to problems in civil jury selection.30  The continued use of
the peremptory strike, in criminal litigation under Batson guide-
lines, is indispensable in assuring an impartial jury trial;30 7 how-
ever, the peremptory challenge should be eradicated from all
forms of civil litigation.3 08 A brief survey of various alternatives
to the peremptory challenge system follows.
strict the use of peremptory challenges by the white defendants).
303. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
304. J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 169 (1977). See generally L. MOORE,
THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIaTv 134 (1973) (cited in VAN DYKE, supra).
305. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 249-302 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 236-47 and accompanying text.
308. Recall that in Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1986),
discussed supra notes 150-63 and accompanying text, the state was a party to the civil
action. Clark, 645 F. Supp. at 891. State action poses no problem in this context, thereby
permitting the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause, upon which Batson was
based, to be applied. To avoid confusion and further the desire for order and uniformity
in the judicial system, however, the peremptory challenge should be eradicated entirely
from civil litigation, including proceedings similar to Clark.
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a. Non- Viable Alternatives
There exist several plausible approaches to the jury selec-
tion problem in civil litigation. Three of them are discussed
here. While each alternative has unique benefits, all three result
in more damage than redress.
The first of these is limiting the voir dire.3 09 This can be
accomplished in three ways. First, in an effort to promote judi-
cial economy, several courts curtail the number and types of
questions that can be asked of a potential juror.3 10 The irony of
employing this tactic is that the lawyer would most likely need
her peremptory challenges to strike those prospective jurors not
sufficiently questioned, or risk their partiality. " Second, it has
been suggested that to expedite the selection process, all venire
persons should be questioned together, as a group, rather than
individually."1 2 "Such a procedure [,however,] makes it difficult
for people who are not accustomed to speaking in front of others
to respond to the questions .... ,' More importantly, it is very
likely that venire members will respond with answers tempered
by the situation or according to the societal norm.3 14 Third, is
the method of "judge-conducted voir dire. ' s31  This procedure
has been used in many jurisdictions. 16 Judicial economy is also
served here, but the right to an impartial jury is not furthered.
309. See supra note 1 for a detailed discussion of the typical voir dire process.
310. Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power", 27 STAN. L. REV. 545,
546 (1975). See also Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973) (trial court's failure to
question the venire about its reaction to facial hair was ignored by the Supreme Court
despite a bearded defendant).
311. The Court in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1965), recognized that
the "voir dire in American trials tends to be extensive and probing ...." The Court
considered this thorough practice necessary to impanel a proper jury. Id. at 219.
312. Babcock, supra note 310, at 547.
313. Id.
314. Prospective jurors that are outwardly biased may not readily reveal their biases
when questioned in front of a large number of persons. It is far easier to be candid when
in more intimate surroundings. See Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical
Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 511 (1965).
315. Babcock, supra note 310, at 548.
316. See, e.g., People v. Crowe, 8 Cal. 3d 815, 506 P.2d 193, 106 Cal. Rptr. 369
(1973). See also Suggs & Sales, Juror Self-Disclosure in the Voir Dire: A Social Science
Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 245 (1981) (although questioning is currently conducted by most
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In fact, the time conserved during the voir dire is actually a
function of the quantity and quality of the questions asked by
the judge.17 It is reasonable to suppose that the judge would not
pursue the inquiry with the vigor exhibited by private counsel.
Certainly, there exists no adversarial desire for victory, not to
mention the quest to pocket legal fees.
The second alternative to the peremptory challenge is to ex-
pand the jury pool. 18 It is more likely that a representative
cross-section would be impaneled if there were a greater number
of venire persons to choose from. 19 However, quantity and qual-
ity also come into play here and must be assessed together. To
have a larger pool, the present eligibility standards designed to
"weed out" incompetent and incompatible individuals must be
relaxed.2 0 However, this could result in an impaneled jury of a
more invidiously discriminatory nature than a peremptory sys-
tem would ever permit.
The third alternative is to suggest that the peremptory sys-
tem be reduced but not abolished.3 2' As the federal statute ap-
plicable to civil trials now states, "each party shall be entitled to
three peremptory challenges .... [T]he court may allow addi-
tional peremptory challenges .. .to be exercised . 22 Per-
haps, the argument goes, if the permitted number of peremptory
strikes was limited by statute even more than they are now, law-
yers could still remove some potential jurors believed to be bi-
317. Suggs & Sales, supra note 316.
318. See, e.g., Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 § 101, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1982).
This Act requires that venire members in federal court be selected from voter registra-
tion lists. The Act also requires that additional lists be utilized if voter lists alone prove
inadequate to promote random jury selection.
319. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 36 Cal. 3d 36, 679 P.2d 433, 201 Cal. Rptr. 782
(1984) (defendant made a prima facie showing by demonstrating that voter lists alone
failed to provide a sufficient pool from which an impartial jury could be selected).
320. For example, a requirement such as "good moral character," R.I. GEN. LAws §
9-9-23 (1985), which allows the clerk discretion in selecting members for the venire,
would have to be abolished or greatly eased.
321. For example, in 1977 there was an attempt to reduce the number of peremp-
tory challenges in federal criminal actions. See Act of July 30, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-78, §
2(c), 91 Stat. 319 (the rejection by Congress of the Supreme Court's 1976 proposed
amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which would have limited the
number of peremptory challenges to five for each side in non-capital felony matters and
twelve per side in capital cases).




ased, or unfit for jury responsibilities, though not partial enough
to be challenged for cause. Nevertheless, this idea is unsatisfac-
tory. The right to serve on a jury must also be considered. 32 3
Further, the root of the evil sought to be eliminated would still
remain: the attorney could still discriminate through the use of
the peremptory challenge, albeit to a lesser degree. Such a con-
cession is certainly not a positive stride toward eliminating par-
tial juries.
b. The Challenge for Cause Approach
This Comment has discussed the important role of the pe-
remptory challenge in criminal litigation to preserve the consti-
tutional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury,""4 and has ad-
vocated the challenge's abolition from all civil proceedings.2
Various options to the peremptory challenge were examined and
rejected. However, a challenge for cause 26 approach would suf-
fice to protect the impartiality concerns of civil litigants. The
initial advantage of such a system is that it already exists. It
requires no upheaval of the jury selection process and no revolu-
tionary voir dire procedures.
Almost two centuries ago, Chief Justice Marshall
commented:
[L]ight impressions which may fairly be supposed to yield to the
testimony that may be offered; which may leave the mind open to
a fair consideration of that testimony, constitute no sufficient ob-
jection to a juror; but those strong and deep impressions, which
323. See, e.g., Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946). The Ballard Court re-
versed a federal conviction because women were deliberately excluded from both the
grand and petit juries. The Court concluded that "[t]he injury is not limited to the de-
fendant - there is injury to the jury system .... Id. at 195; see also Carter v. Jury
Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970). In Carter, the plaintiff was granted relief from jury service
exclusion. The Court held that "[d]efendants ... do not have the only cognizable legal
interest in nondiscriminatory jury selection." Id. at 329.
In Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 558 (1979), the Court equated the injury suffered
by the excluded venire person with that forbidden by the equal protection clause. "[Al-
though] alternative remedies remain to vindicate the rights of those members of the class
denied the chance to serve on . . . juries .... permitting challenges to unconstitutional
state action by defendants has been, and is, the main avenue by which Fourteenth
Amendment rights are vindicated in this context." Id.
324. See supra notes 236-47 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 303-08 and accompanying text.
326. See supra note 1.
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will close the mind against the testimony that may be offered in
opposition to them; which will combat the testimony and resist
its force, do constitute a sufficient objection to him. 2 7
The challenge for cause permits people holding varying views
and ideas concerning a case to participate as jurors, as long as
they set aside any preconceived notions and opinions during the
trial and subsequent deliberations.2"
The cause system is actually more effective than the pe-
remptory system. The challenge for cause is used intellectually,
based upon the lawyer's assessment of information gathered
from the voir dire, and not whimsically, as the peremptory chal-
lenge is often exercised.
Two alterations to the present cause system are necessary
before adopting it as the only challenge system in civil actions.
First, the trial court cannot rely exclusively on the prospective
jurors to be entirely candid about their biases.32 9 Trial judges
must exercise broad discretion in permitting challenges for cause
while observing prospective jurors' reactions during the voir
dire.330
Second, the information concerning venire members,
amassed during the voir dire, must be enlarged and improved.
To logically challenge potential jurors, enough must be known
about their beliefs and ideals. This is the drawback of refusing
to permit the haphazard striking of prospective jurors for any
reason at all, as the peremptory system condones.
To accomplish this second modification, the expansion of
the voir dire and the promotion of judicial economy must be bal-
anced. The trial judge frequently limits questioning, for the sake
of efficiency, regardless of promising lines of inquiry331 In the
peremptory system, the attorney need only strike potential ju-
rors without explanation, thereby eliminating any concern about
their personalities and views not exposed during questioning. In
an exclusive challenge for cause approach, however, the justice
327. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692).
328. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
329. Many jurisdictions will not infer that a prospective juror is biased; rather, the
bias must be self-proclaimed by the prospective juror before the court will find her inca-
pable of fairness. See generally Babcock, supra note 310, at 549-50.
330. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 168 (1950).
331. See Babcock, supra note 310, at 546.
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system may at times have to sacrifice efficiency to preserve the
right to an impartial jury. Perhaps, though, judicial economy
may be better served because an impartial jury will result in
fewer appeals and new trials.
Admittedly, the challenge for cause approach is not a per-
fect solution. It is possible, for example, that biased jurors may
be impaneled despite the existence of safeguards to remove
them. Attorneys are only human and cannot read the minds of
venire members. It is in this situation that the peremptory chal-
lenge is truly indispensable. However, where the stakes are
lower, as in civil proceedings,32 such a disturbing prospect is of
secondary significance. Impartiality is better served by a cause
system, because courts and society will be reasonably cognizant
that the jury panel hearing the evidence, deliberating, and
reaching a verdict, is the product of a judicial system that strives
to protect the constitutional rights of both the litigant and the
juror.
IV. Conclusion
"Denying jury service to any group deprives... [clourts [of]
the justice that flows from impartial juries . . . ." With the
advent of Batson, Lyndon Johnson's ominous words are rather
tame now. Batson has seized the wild bull by the horns and has
shaped the peremptory challenge into the instrument by which
our constitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury is pre-
served in criminal litigation.
However, the civil sphere still falls short of the jury system
cherished by Blackstone " and Jefferson.2 Batson is not the
appropriate standard for civil trials; we must look elsewhere for
reform. One need not look any further than the present jury se-
lection procedure for a solution.
The peremptory challenge in civil litigation plays a much
smaller role in assuring impartiality than does its criminal trial
counterpart. Life and liberty are not at issue. Although benefi-
332. See supra notes 240-47 and accompanying text.
333. 1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF LYNDON B. JOHNSON 461, 464 (1966) (statement to Congress
proposing stronger civil rights legislation).
334. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
335. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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cial if it can be managed properly, the peremptory challenge can
be deadly if uncontrolled. Therefore, the peremptory challenge
should be abolished from civil litigation. The cause system ade-
quately protects litigants and jurors alike, while promoting the
constitutional notions of justice and impartiality.
Eric D. Katz
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